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INTRODUCTION 
Immigrant integration is a central issue in contemporary societies. It is at the core of 
both public debate and intimate reflection, since it challenges both national identity and 
socio-economic cohesion. It pertains, at the same time, the private encounter with the 
‘other’ and the communities’ best way of allocating resources and opportunities for all. 
For this reason, it is at the top of countries’ policy agenda, both from an economic and a 
social standpoint. 
While the American debate, started at the beginning of 1900s, focused on the 
assimilation of European immigrants living in the U.S., the more recent European 
debate refers to the concept of integration. In particular, in the American reflection, the 
term “assimilation” implies an idea of mainstream respect to which immigrants and 
their children can become similar, following a process which, especially for the second-
generation immigrants, can shape up-ward assimilation (Alba and Nee, 1997), down-
ward assimilation (Gans, 1992) or segmented assimilation (Portes and Zhou, 1993; 
Portes et al., 2009). In the European context, instead, the term “integration” suggests 
structural modes of incorporation, which mainly depends on immigrants’ educational 
attainment and access to the labour market. High educational and professional careers 
are some of the indicators for immigrants to be integrated into the European societies.  
Immigrant integration is considered a strategic policy priority at European Union (EU) 
level. It became a topic for the EU institutions in the 1990s, because of the increasing 
immigrant population residing in European countries. In 1999, the Tampere Programme 
established an EU cooperation on the integration of non-EU nationals, thus including 
the integration issues in EU competencies. In 2003, the European Commission defined 
integration as ‘a two-way process’, which implies efforts from both the immigrants and 
the host society and it is developed over time (Pennix, 2004; Mussino et al., 2014). The 
2004 ‘Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration Policies in the EU’ set out 
the importance of developing goals and indicators to implement policies and evaluate 
the national efforts and actions on integration. In 2007, the European Commission 
produced the ‘Handbook on Integration’ with the aim of promoting the exchange of 
good practices among policy-makers and experts across Europe. The 2010 Zaragoza 
Ministerial Conference Member States established a set of core indicators, which are 
one of the most important sources of integration indicators at European level. They 
cover four policy areas: employment, education, social inclusion and active integration. 
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However, in the 2011 ‘European Agenda for the Integration of Third Country 
Nationals', the EU interpreted its role as limited to establish common standards for 
immigrant integration measures, to exchange best practices and successful models of 
integration and to support integration strategies in the EU member states. In this field, 
the EU acts more as a framework of standards and recommendations and as a forum for 
dialogue and information exchange for the development of integration strategies 
(Bosswick and Heckmann, 2006), rather than as a policy-maker strictu senso.  
Since the integration process of immigrants takes place primarily at local level 
(Penninx, 2003), the EU entitles member states to design and implement integration 
policies. However, their policy-making process depends on the interpretation they give 
to the concept and definition of integration, which is not equal and univocal. On the 
contrary, it varies across the EU member states, mainly depending on their first mass 
immigration experience and on the degree of institutionalization of such a phenomenon 
(Freeman, 1995). In other words, it varies according to countries’ philosophies of 
integration or to the so-called ‘traditional national models of immigration and 
integration’, which have been defined as “nationally distinct approaches to managing 
migration ﬂows and their political consequences” (Freeman, 2006: 227), such as the 
integration of immigrants, through the construction of “abstract typologies of 
incorporation regimes” (Freeman, 2004: 946). 
As recognized by a wide range of scholars, the integration of immigrants is shaped both 
by resources from within their own families and communities, and by the educational, 
social and economic opportunities that institutions provide (e.g. Piché, 2004; Crul et al., 
2012; Hou and Bonikowska, 2016). Evidence shows that currently opportunities and life 
chances, as well as social welfare benefits for immigrants are significantly lower 
compared to those of natives (Morris, 2001; Guiraudon, 2014; Busetta, 2015). In 
particular, recent studies have found that immigrants are more exposed to the risk of 
experiencing ‘ethnic penalties’ (Koopmans, 2016), which are forms of discrimination at 
work, unemployment, over-qualification and employment in the underground economy 
(Reyneri, 2001), than natives. In addition, immigrants suffer more economic downturns, 
as occurred with the 2008 economic crisis (Pastore and Villosio, 2011; De Rose and 
Strozza, 2015).  
Integration patterns are the main forces driving long-term success in the lifetimes of 
immigrants. Therefore, integration should be seen as fundamental to ensure social 
cohesion in the EU and to prevent marginalization, especially in a period marked by 
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terroristic events and unprecedented movements of people globally – whether escaping 
from war and persecution, or towards fresh starts and economic opportunity – that in 
various countries all over the EU have shaped populist claims and social resentment 
against immigrants. 
To advance the European vision, my work intends to verify if integration acts as the 
ensemble of the “processes that increase the opportunities of immigrants and their 
descendants to obtain the valued ‘stuff’ of a society, as well as social acceptance, 
through participation in major institutions such as the educational and political system 
and the labour and housing markets” (Alba and Foner, 2016: 5). In other words, my 
study aims to understand if integration policies help immigrants to enhance their long-
term success and their parity with natives.  
My thesis is structured along three papers. The first paper takes origin from a broader 
analysis of the literature on integration and integration policies at European level. This 
led me to offer a comparative overview of civic integration programmes adopted by 
European countries in recent years, in order to shed light on their main features and, in 
particular, on the rationale that is behind the European convergence towards civic 
integration. The European debate on the “civic direction” (Joppke 2004: 253) is focused 
on ‘old’ European immigration countries. ‘New’ immigration countries appear to be 
involved in the European convergence towards civic integration as well, but remain 
excluded from this debate. For this reason, I choose to focus on Italy as one of the ‘new’ 
immigration countries with the largest migration inflows in Europe.  
Through a systematic review of actual legal texts and academic literature, I study how 
civic integration challenges immigrants’ entry, settlement and citizenship. My 
hypothesis is that a philosophy based on migration control and selection underpins civic 
integration, creating new requirements that immigrants have to fulfil and respect as 
universal values. Civic integration is intrinsically connected to citizenship. In particular, 
it establishes under what conditions someone with eligibility obtain the citizenship 
status of the new residence country (Wallace Goodman, 2012). In other words, civic 
integration appears to be as a new standard for a successfully integrated member of the 
European societies, that is the citizen. Citizenship status is recognized as an objective 
indicator of integration, such as educational attainment, household income, employment 
or housing (e.g. Portes and Curtis, 1987; Yang, 1994; Vink, 2013), because by granting 
to immigrants the same status and rights of native-born residents, it reduces gaps with 
natives and equalizes new to old citizens, thus formally making them integrated.  
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The acquisition of citizenship status of the new residence country is influenced by 
immigrants’ characteristics, such as socio-economic assimilation to the residence 
country and demographic characteristics, and by structural and institutional factors in 
both origin and destination countries. Among the latter, we have policy factors and 
precisely national citizenship policies, which establish who is eligible for naturalization 
(Peters et al., 2015). Therefore, the acquisition of citizenship status perfectly reflects the 
idea that both immigrants and the host society play a role in the integration process of 
individuals. Within these considerations, the second paper aims to examine the effect of 
both individual-level characteristics and measures of national citizenship policies on the 
likelihood of having citizenship status among immigrants living in selected European 
countries. On this regard, it is helpful to highlight that in a pivotal work, Yang (1994) 
elucidated that immigrants decide to naturalize after a ‘cost-benefit’ analysis. The 
benefit consists in the acquisition of the same social, political and economic rights of 
natives, while costs depend on some factors related to the national citizenship policies, 
such as the fulfilment of the residence requirements for naturalization, long application 
processes and the potential loss of the native citizenship. However, conditions for 
naturalization largely vary across countries. In my view, the germs of these differences 
can be found in the traditional national models of immigration and integration, although 
they evolved toward new measures over time, as the civic integration convergence 
makes clear. For this paper, individual level data stem from the Immigrant Citizens 
Survey (ICS), conducted by the King Baudouin Foundation and the Migration Policy 
Group, from October 2011 to January 2012. Country-level data come from a systematic 
review of national citizenship policies, academic literature and the Eurostat database.  
Finally, the last paper arises from the consideration that to fully understand integration, 
especially its dynamic and multidimensional character, is not sufficient to investigate 
only its ‘objective’ forms. Instead, one must also study ‘subjective’ integration (Neto, 
1995; 2011; Amit, 2010), in order to take into account immigrants’ perceptions and 
opinions about their experience into the residence country and, therefore, their 
integration process. Self-reported life satisfaction is particularly suitable to evaluate 
immigrants’ integration process into the residence country, as it is commonly used to 
estimate the perceived quality of life within a country or a specific social group. In 
particular, life satisfaction has been defined as “a global assessment of a person’s 
quality of life according to his chosen criteria” (Shin and Johnson, 1978, cit. in Dieder 
et al., 1985: 71), therefore to the criteria judged important by the individual. This paper, 
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therefore, aims to advance the research strand of subjective integration, by measuring 
the effect of demographic, human capital and ‘immigration’ variables on the self-
reported life satisfaction of young and adult immigrants living in selected European 
countries, using the ICS data.  
The positive linkage existing between citizenship status and life satisfaction in the 
residence country (Massey and Akresh, 2006) provides evidence for the objective 
character of naturalization in shaping integration, which, although made more 
demanding by civic requirements, represents, to this day, the best way for immigrants to 
acquire parity with natives. 
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1. THE EUROPEAN CONVERGENCE TOWARDS CIVIC 
INTEGRATION  
 
1.1. Introduction 
A series of events, such as the 9/11 terroristic attacks in New York City and 
Washington, D.C, the political rise and murder of Pim Fortuyn in 2002 in the 
Netherlands, the attacks of the 11 March 2004 in Madrid and of the 7 July 2005 in 
London, the murder of the film director Theo Van Gogh during November 2004 in 
Amsterdam and the 2005 Paris riots have highlighted the lack of integration and the 
socio-economic marginalization of populations with immigrant background, especially 
those with Muslim origins. This has led hosting countries to reassess their integration 
policies, emphasizing the need of improving immigrants’ socio-economic integration, 
through the knowledge of the language of the hosting society, the respect of the national 
identity, the promotion of the culture and values of the hosting society among 
immigrants. For this reason, it has been argued that European countries have converged 
towards civic integration (Joppke, 2007b; Zincone, 2011).  
With the expression civic integration, we generally refer to those policies requiring 
immigrants to learn the language, the civic values and the culture of the residence 
country. Civic integration policies often require immigrants, through the signature of an 
‘integration agreement’ or an ‘integration contract’, to take language and civic courses1 
immediately after their entry into the new country of residence, in order to ask for a 
permit of stay or to apply for the citizenship status. Sometimes courses are organized in 
origin countries, in order to facilitate the so-called ‘integration process from abroad’ or, 
more likely, to prevent or limit the entry of those immigrants who are considered 
particularly difficult to integrate. The success of immigrants in civic integration courses 
implies the issue or the renewal of the permit of stay and the granting of naturalization, 
while the failure means the denial or the non-renewal of permits of stay and 
naturalization (Joopke, 2007a). However, civic integration can also include ‘civic 
participation’ (Vogel and Triandafyllidou, 2005; Gsir, 2014) and, therefore, the active 
engaging of immigrants in political parties, labour unions, ethnic associations and 
                                                          
1 Several doubts about the coherence between the compulsory nature of these courses and liberal 
principles have been raised (Joppke, 2004; 2007a; 2007b; 2012). 
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migrants organizations in destination countries, and the local vote. The local vote has 
been defined by Baubock (2006: 24) as a “residential citizenship that is disconnected by 
the nation-state membership”: currently, it is granted by 15 of the 28 European Union 
(EU) member states to Third-Country Nationals (TCNs) (Groenendijk, 2014). Anti-
discrimination policies, that is, actions aimed at preventing episodes of discrimination 
and xenophobia towards immigrants and their descendants in hosting societies and at 
ensuring basic civil and social rights, such as healthcare, housing and public schooling 
for their children, are considered forms of civic integration as well. In particular, the 
transmission of the language and the culture of the country of settlement to immigrants’ 
children, together with the socialization with natives, are seen as functional to the 
integration process of the entire immigrant family. 
Regardless of their capacity to promote immigrants’ socio-economic integration and to 
foster social cohesion in the hosting society, civic integration policies seem to favour “a 
certain degree of socio-cultural assimilation” (Sciortino, 2014: 261) and to contribute to 
the decline of multiculturalism as integration philosophy (Joppke and Morawska, 2003; 
Joppke, 2004); on the contrary, the “category of practice” (Sciortino, 2003: 276) of 
multiculturalism appears to remain at the core of the social relationship between 
immigrant and hosting society in almost all liberal states, with hosting countries being 
more heterogeneous than their policies state ‘on paper’2. However, I argue that the 
grade of socio-cultural assimilation produced by civic integration, as well as the 
coercive nature of its programmes, can vary geographically, because of countries’ 
immigration experience and of their traditional national models of immigration and 
integration. 
In light of these considerations, this paper aims to offer an overview of civic integration 
programmes adopted by European countries over time, in order to shed light on their 
main features and, in particular, on the rationale that is behind the European 
convergence towards civic integration. My hypothesis is that a philosophy based on 
migration control and selection underpins this convergence. This philosophy is coherent 
with the EU policy ideology, which appears to be marked by a ‘securitization’ approach 
towards migration. The European debate on the “civic direction” (Joppke, 2004: 253) 
                                                          
2 The case of France is illustrative. As stressed by Simon (2012), although multiculturalism in France is 
still rather rejected by both the political and public debate, France is multicultural, since its population is 
largely and increasingly diverse. Minority identities are not necessarily conflicting with the sense of 
belonging and assimilation to France; immigrants are transnational beings, who live constantly a sort of 
‘double presence’ in both the origin and the destination country, therefore they can be integrated or 
‘assimilated’ into the host society without renouncing to their identity. 
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undertaken by integration policies in the last decade is mainly focused on ‘old’ 
European immigration countries. ‘New’ immigration countries appear to be involved in 
the European convergence towards civic integration as well, but generally remain 
excluded from this debate. Therefore, I choose to focus on Italy as one of the Southern 
European countries with the largest migration inflows in Europe, despite the recent 
economic crisis (Pastore and Villosio, 2011). The paper comprises the following 
sections: an analysis of the EU framework on immigrant integration; a discussion of the 
traditional national models of immigration and integration; an explanation of the data 
and method used; a description of various civic integration programmes across Europe 
and a focus on the civic integration in Italy. The paper ends with the discussion of these 
programmes in the final section.  
 
1.2. The EU framework on immigrant integration  
Although often seen as a sort of ‘pendulum’ between actions aimed at protecting the EU 
from unwanted immigration and measures on the admission and the settlement of 
migrants in its member states, there is general agreement on the existence of a common 
EU migration and asylum policy (e.g. Faist and Andreas, 2007; Boswell and Geddes, 
2011). With the increase of migration inflows, the EU migration and asylum policy has 
become progressively more restrictive: it appears to be marked by a ‘securitization’ 
approach (Carling, 2002; Geddes, 2003; Bonjour, 2011), both at the level of policy 
measures and at the level of public debate. Moreover, with the effort of policy 
harmonization, the ‘securitization’ approach has affected the EU member states’ 
immigration measures as well. Strict border controls, stringent visa requirements, 
draconian asylum procedures and demanding administrative measures have made 
migration and residence in the EU more complicated. For this reason, it can be argued 
that “under control” (Bendel, 2007) has become one of the distinctive features of the EU 
migration and asylum policy. The Treaty of Amsterdam is considered a very important 
starting point of this policy since in 1999 it transferred asylum and immigration policies 
in a new Title IV of the Treaty dealing with free movement, migration and asylum. In 
particular, the Treaty of Amsterdam provided for the European competences on external 
border controls; reception of asylum seekers; conditions of entry and residence for 
TCNs and fight against illegal migration. The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 
December 2009 marked a further step towards a real communitarization (Geddes, 2003) 
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by transferring more powers to the EU institutions. Starting from Amsterdam, three 
five-years work plans have been organized, with the aim of monitoring and actualizing 
treaties’ provisions on migration and asylum (Boswell and Geddes, 2011). The Tampere 
Programme covered the period 1999-2004, with the agenda of enhancing cooperation 
with third countries, promoting fair treatment of TCNs regularly residing in the EU 
member states, establishing a European Asylum System and controlling irregular 
migration. The Hague Programme (2005-09) intended to create a common asylum area 
and reinforce measures to contrast illegal migration, trafficking and smuggling. Finally, 
the Stockholm Programme (2010-14) tried to counterbalance the goal of promoting the 
socio-economic development of immigrants’ origin countries on the one hand, by 
incrementing the protection of the ‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ on the other 
hand (Kostakopoulou, 2012).   
Conversely, a similar consensus on the existence of a common EU immigrant 
integration policy does not exist. Integration became a topic for the EU institutions in 
the 1990s, as a result of the increasing immigrant population residing in European 
countries. In particular, considering that what “happens after” the entry (Favell, 2003: 
14) often reflects what happens at the entry, and that could be defined an ‘immigration-
integration nexus’ perspective (Pastore and Sciortino, 2001; Penninx, 2003), the 
Tampere Programme in 1999 established an EU cooperation on the integration of non-
EU nationals, thus including the integration issues in EU competencies. The 
Thessaloniki summit of June 2003 and the consequent publication of the 
‘Communication on Immigration, Integration and Employment’ confirmed the EU 
interest in immigrant integration. The 2004 ‘Common Basic Principles for Immigrant 
Integration Policies in the EU’ set out the importance of developing goals and indicators 
to implement policies and evaluate the national efforts and actions on integration. In 
2007, the ‘Handbook on Integration’ was produced by the European Commission with 
the aim of promoting the exchange of good practices among policy-makers and experts 
across Europe. The ‘Common Basic Principles’ were also adopted in Malmo in 2009. 
Four core areas, employment, education, social inclusion and active citizenship, and 14 
core indicators were set out in that occasion. The 2010 Zaragoza Ministerial Conference 
Member States established a set of core outcome indicators, which are now considered 
some of the most important sources of integration indicators at European level. 
However, in the 2011 ‘European Agenda for the Integration of Third Country 
Nationals’, the EU’s role was limited to the establishment of common standards for 
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integration measures, to the exchange of best practices and successful models of 
integration and to support integration strategies in the EU member states. Therefore, it 
can be concluded that the EU contributes almost exclusively to orientate and coordinate 
states’ integration policies. In particular, it acts as a framework of standards and 
recommendations and as a forum of dialogue and information exchange (Bosswick and 
Heckmann, 2006) for the development of integration strategies, rather than as a policy-
maker. For this reason, it can be argued that a common EU immigrant integration policy 
does not exist (yet). Nevertheless, it is incontrovertible that the EU principles and 
guidelines are able to influence the formulation and the implementation of integration 
policies at national level and can help producing a harmonization and a convergence of 
integration measures across Europe. 
While the term and the meaning of integration can be understood differently among the 
EU member states, mainly depending on the timing when they experienced their first 
mass immigration and on the level of institutionalization of such a phenomenon 
(Freeman, 1995), EU generally considers integration as a “dynamic, two-way process of 
mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of Member States” (Justice and 
Common Affairs Council, 2004). From this perspective, immigrants have to 
demonstrate their willing to be integrated into the host society and to respect its rules 
and values. On the other hand, the host societies have to answer to immigrants’ needs 
and make efforts to grant and preserve their culture and origins. Since the integration 
process takes place primarily at local level (Penninx, 2004; Penninx et al., 2004), with 
cities and municipalities as the places where immigrants are received and natives 
encounter new cultures and identities, the EU argues that integration policies should be 
developed primarily at local level. According to the principle of subsidiarity, the local 
level appears closer to immigrants in providing services they need and, at the same 
time, more apt in managing their interaction with natives. Nevertheless, a strong 
coordination between all the actors involved in the integration process, therefore the 
European institutions, the EU member states, the national, regional and local authorities, 
as well as NGOs and migrants organizations, is considered necessary in order to 
produce consistent and effective integration policies.  
 
1.3. The traditional national models of immigration and integration 
Academic literature generally distinguishes among three traditional national models of 
immigration and integration: the exclusionist model, the assimilationist model and the 
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multiculturalist or pluralist model (e.g. Castles, 1995; Koopmans and Statham, 1999). 
This kind of categorization reflects the fact that the debate on integration and integration 
policies have been historically mainly focused on the so-called ‘old’ immigration 
countries. Nevertheless, if the ‘new’ immigration countries (Italy, Greece, Portugal and 
Spain) are taken into consideration, this categorization becomes incomplete (Freeman, 
1995). Therefore, I suggest that the Southern European model, which characterizes the 
‘new’ immigration countries (e.g. Baganha, 1997; King et al., 2000; Peixoto et al., 
2012), also is considered, when referring to the traditional national models of 
immigration and integration. 
The exclusionist model of integration (Germany (pre-2000), Austria and Belgium-
Flanders) considers migration as a temporary and functional phenomenon: a means to 
meet short labour demands. Immigrants are expected to return home rather than 
permanently settle in the host country. Consequently, the permit of stay is often linked 
to the job contract: the expiration of the job contract means the loss of the right to live 
in the host country. Immigrants are well integrated into the labour market, but not in the 
social and political community (they are generally excluded from welfare systems, 
citizenship rights and political participation). Countries fitting this model are quite 
reluctant to permanent settlement, family reunification and immigrants’ naturalization. 
Citizenship rights are based on “ethno-cultural belonging to nationhood” (Koopmans 
and Statham, 1999: 660) and therefore mainly on the principle of ius sanguinis. 
According to the assimilationist model (France), immigrants are expected to be fully 
incorporated in the host country as individuals: they have to accept and internalize both 
values and culture of the country of settlement. The existence and maintenance of ethnic 
communities is prevented since these are seen as a sign of incomplete assimilation. As a 
consequence, the naturalization is relatively easy, since it is essentially based on civic 
territorial criteria and, therefore, on ius soli. However, it is noteworthy, for instance, that 
France evolved towards more pluralist policy measures over the years, with a mixture of 
ius sanguinis and ius soli, as it will be clarified in the second paper.  
According to the multiculturalist or pluralist model (Britain, the Netherlands and 
Sweden), immigrants’ culture and origins should be granted, preserved and enhanced, 
“as positive marks of a diverse heritage” (Simon, 2012: 3). Hosting societies that adopt 
multiculturalist or pluralist models of immigrant integration generally show a strong 
willingness to include ethnic minorities into their community, respecting their language 
and their cultural and religious differences. Although immigrants do not always have 
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the benefit of full social and political rights, ethnic communities are officially accepted, 
forms of ethnic entrepreneurship are encouraged and quotas of social benefits and 
facilities are reserved to them. Nevertheless, the academic literature has recently 
questioned the validity of such a model (Poppelaars and Scholten, 2008; Duyvendak 
and Scholten, 2011) and the capacity of multiculturalism to grant immigrants equality 
and emancipation (Koopmans, 2010).  
The last model of integration is that of the ‘new’ immigration countries or the Southern 
European model (Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain). As pointed out by Freeman (1995), 
only a few years ago these countries were characterized by “the near complete absence 
of any institutional mechanisms or administrative experience as to planning and 
regulating immigration” (1995: 894). As a consequence, these countries do not have a 
strong integration ideology and integration practices are still embryonic and 
spontaneous, although rather inclusive. For instance, the expression “implicit model of 
integration” or “subordinate integration” has been coined for Italy (Ambrosini, 2001; 
2005), in order to denote an unintended and unsystematic way of integrating 
immigrants, which tends to privilege the economic inclusion (therefore, into the labour 
market), with forms of over-qualification and labour “ethnicization” (Ambrosini, 2013: 
183), rather than the full political participation of immigrants. This de facto integration 
process is, in some extent, similar to the so-called “differential exclusion model” 
described by Castles (1995: 294), according to which certain dimensions of integration 
are favoured, such as the socio-economic dimension.  
I believe that the European convergence towards civic integration is not necessarily 
competing with the traditional national models of immigration and integration. In other 
words, the civic integration convergence does not mark a decline of the traditional 
national models of immigration and integration. On the contrary, these models remain 
and can represent useful interpretative criteria of the civic integration programmes 
adopted by European countries over the years. Nevertheless, though the usefulness of 
models in reducing the complexity of the issue of the immigrant integration, explaining 
and taking into account the national differences and making international comparisons, 
has been largely demonstrated by the numerous classifications of integration policies 
available in the academic literature (e.g. Brubaker, 1992; Favell, 1998; Castles and 
Miller, 2009), models should be not considered as static and immutable identities able 
to perfectly explain the social processes, that is, the relationship between immigrant and 
hosting society (Bertossi, 2011; Bertossi and Duyvendak, 2012). Sometimes this 
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relationship can diverge from the dominant policy model and conceptualization, taking 
forms, which often do not correspond to the alleged national models of immigrant 
integration. As already stressed (e.g. Cento Bull, 2010; Czaika and de Haas, 2013), a 
gap between the normative model (policy discourse), the policy practices (policy 
outcomes) and, finally, the social processes, may exist. Several reasons can produce this 
gap: at national level, electoral needs and economic interests can lead policy-makers to 
implement measures that can contradict the policy discourse; at the public opinion level, 
terroristic and tragic events need strong policy actions to reassure the public opinion; at 
international level, the states’ obligations to participate in supranational bodies, for 
instance the EU, can orient national policy strategies and contribute to produce a 
“convergence of specific policy measures” (Finotelli and Michalowski, 2012: 234). 
Therefore, it is important to keep in mind these considerations when interpreting the 
civic integration programmes and their rationale.   
 
1.4. Data and method 
In order to provide an overview of the civic integration programmes adopted in Europe, 
I have made a systematic review of actual legal texts and academic literature. I have 
found civic integration policies in 14 European countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Poland, Spain, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom. As shown in Table 1.1, I have categorized civic 
integration programmes according to the name, the year of implementation, the target 
groups, whether or not civic courses are organized, whether or not language or civic 
tests have to be passed by immigrants, whether or not integration from abroad is 
practised and, finally, whether or not local voting rights are granted to immigrants. In 
the next section, I present the civic integration programmes in a chronological order, in 
other words, according to their year of implementation.  
 
Table 1.1. Overview of civic integration programmes in Europe 
Country 
Name of the 
Programme 
Year Target group Civic course 
Civic 
test 
Integration 
from abroad 
Local 
vote 
The 
Netherlands 
Newcomer 
Integration Law 
1998 
Non-EU and non-
Switzerland 
immigrants 
applying for a 
permanent 
residence permit 
and immigrants 
applying for 
citizenship 
600 hours of 
language, civic 
and labour 
market courses 
Yes 
Yes, for family 
immigrants and 
immigrants who 
planned to 
permanently 
reside in the 
Netherlands 
Yes 
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Denmark 
Danish Integration 
Act: A. Integration 
Program; B. 
Contract of 
Integration and 
Declaration on 
Integration and 
Active Citizenship  
1999 
A. Immigrants 
applying for a 
permanent 
residence permit; 
B. Refugees and 
family 
immigrants 
The Danish 
culture and 
history, social 
conditions in 
Denmark, the 
functioning of 
the labour 
market, the 
welfare system, 
the schooling 
and housing 
system 
No No Yes 
Estonia  
Integration in 
Estonian Society 
2000 
‘Russophone’ 
immigrants and 
immigrants 
working in the 
service sector 
Estonian 
language, values 
and norms 
No No No 
Germany 
Integration Courses 
(‘Integrationskurse’)  
2001 
Immigrants 
applying for a 
permit of stay, 
immigrants 
applying for a 
permanent 
residence permit 
and immigrants 
applying for 
citizenship 
600 hours of 
language course 
and 30 hours of 
civic course  
Yes 
Yes, for family 
immigrants 
No 
Spain 
Integration Plans, 
implemented in 
Cataluña, Madrid 
and Andalucía and 
‘Strategic Plans for 
Citizenship and 
Integration’ 
2001 Not specified 
Orientation, 
juridical 
guidance, 
education and 
language 
courses 
No No Yes 
United 
Kingdom 
Nationality, 
Immigration and 
Asylum Act 
2002 
Permanent 
immigrants and 
immigrants 
applying for 
citizenship 
English for 
Speakers of 
Other 
Languages 
(ESOL) and 
citizenship 
classes 
Yes No Yes 
France 
Integration Contract 
(‘Contrat d’accueil 
et de l’intégration’) 
2003 
Immigrants 
holding a long-
term visa or a 
permit of stay for 
work, study or 
family reasons, 
immigrants with a 
residence card 
and the CE long 
term residence 
card  
A 6 hours civic 
course 
concerning the 
fundamental 
values of the 
French Republic 
and the 
functioning of 
the state; a 
course which 
can ranges from 
1 to 6 hours for 
the learning of 
the access to the 
public services 
and the 
everyday life in 
France; a 400 
hours French 
language course 
Yes No No 
Austria 
Integration 
Agreement  
2003 
Non-EU 
immigrants 
arrived after 
1998, applying 
for a permit of 
stay 
Literacy and 
language, social, 
economic and 
cultural aspects 
of life in Austria  
No No No 
Belgium 
Citizenisation 
(‘Inburgering’) and 
Integration 
Programme 
(including the 
Integration 
Contract), 
implemented in 
2004 
Immigrants of 18 
years and over 
who are registered 
in the National 
Register, are 
living in a 
Flemish city and 
hold a first 
  No No Yes 
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Flanders temporary permit 
of stay 
Latvia  Immigration Law 2005 
Immigrants 
applying for a 
permanent 
residence permit 
Language, 
tradition and 
culture courses 
No No   
Greece 
Integration 
Agreement 
2006 
Immigrants 
applying for a 
permanent 
residence permit 
Language and 
culture test 
Yes No No 
Finland 
Personal Integration 
Plan 
2011 
All immigrants 
residing in 
Finland, over 18 
years and 
unemployed  
Language 
courses, 
information on 
the labour 
market, 
education, 
schooling for 
children and 
healthcare 
system 
No No Yes 
Poland 
Integration 
Programs  
2012 
Refugees, 
repatriates and 
their familiars 
Language 
instruction, 
vocational 
training and 
subsistence 
support  
No No No 
Italy 
Integration 
Agreement (‘Patto 
per l’integrazione’) 
2012 
Immigrants 
applying for a 
permit of stay and 
immigrants 
applying for the 
‘EC residence 
permit for long-
term residents’ 
(the permanent 
residence permit). 
Language, 
fundamental 
principles of the 
Constitution; 
civic life, health, 
education, social 
services  and 
labour market 
sectors 
Yes No No 
Source: Own elaboration on various sources 
 
1.5. Civic integration programmes across Europe   
The Netherlands has been pioneer in the civic integration, introducing the ‘Newcomer 
Integration Law’ in 1998, which required most non-EU immigrants to attend a 12-
month integration course, consisting in 600 hours of language, civic and labour market 
courses. Both the state and the municipalities organized courses. The law was revised in 
2006, introducing a series of more demanding amendments (Fischler, 2014). In 
particular, all immigrants from outside the EU and Switzerland applying for a residence 
permit for an indefinite period were required to attend an integration course and to pay 
for it. The issue of the permanent residence permit and the grant of the naturalization 
were linked to the success in passing an integration test. Family immigrants and other 
immigrants who planned to permanently reside in the Netherlands were asked to take an 
integration test at the Dutch Embassy or Consulate in their origin country or in the 
country where they were residing from at least three months. Courses had to be 
organized by private organizations in each municipality and rather than by the state, as 
in the past (Joppke, 2007b; Bruquetas-Callejo et al., 2011; Fischler, 2014). Immigrants 
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who failed in the compliance of the integration test were not granted the residence 
permit. However, while compliance with the test did not imply the issue of the 
residence permit, eventually a permit/special visa would be issued only for one year. 
This special document subsequently allowed the application for the residence permit. 
Since January 2013, all immigrants, including asylum seekers, are required to pay for 
both the integration course and the integration exam. Moreover, starting from January 
2014 the ‘Participation Agreement’ has been introduced by municipalities with the aim 
of teaching immigrants the fundamental norms and principles of Dutch society. This 
agreement is targeted especially to family migrants, refugees, EU work migrants and 
immigrants from Turkey and former Antilles (Fischler, 2014).  
In 1999, Denmark introduced the ‘Danish Integration Act’, with the aim to teach 
immigrants the core values and norms of Danish society. The implementation of the 
‘Danish Integration Act’ takes place at local level with municipalities primarily 
responsible for providing immigrants with the ‘Integration Program’. In particular, 
immigrants are asked to be enrolled in an ‘Integration Program’ in order to learn about 
Danish culture and history, social conditions in Denmark, the functioning of the labour 
market, the welfare system, the schooling and housing system. Participation in the 
‘Integration Program’ is needed to obtain a permanent residence permit and to be 
eligible for social benefits. Immigrants are expected to become economically active and 
culturally integrated into the hosting society, and thus to be suitable to receive social 
rights and benefits (Mouritsen and Jensen, 2014). Moreover, refugees and reunified 
families are asked to sign a compulsory ‘Contract of Integration’ and a ‘Declaration on 
Integration and Active Citizenship’. The Danish language, the respect of democratic 
principles, values of liberty, freedom of speech, gender equality are required to be 
observed by such immigrants, which are considered particularly difficult to integrate. 
Sanctions are enacted in case immigrants refusing to sign both the ‘Contract of 
Integration’ and the ‘Declaration on Integration and Active Citizenship’.  
The ‘Integration in Estonian Society 2000-2007’ and the ‘Integration in Estonian 
Society 2008-2013’ strategies both focused on civic integration, and thus on the 
understanding of Estonian language, values and norms. The main target group of civic 
integration policies in Estonia are the ‘Russophone’ immigrants – that are those who 
have migrated from other parts of the Soviet Union before Estonia’s independence. 
Nevertheless, these integration measures are not compulsory although they are strongly 
recommended for immigrants working in the service sector (Jakobson, 2014). 
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In 2001 Germany introduced the ‘Integrationskurse’ (transl.: ‘Integration courses’), 
founded by the Federal Government. It consisted in 600 hours of a language course and 
30 hours of a civic course (Joopke, 2007b). The 2004 ‘Immigration Law’ made 
conditions for such courses stricter, since the non-compliance of the courses meant the 
non-renewal of the permit of stay and the denial of the permanent residence permit. 
Moreover, sanctions such as the reduction of welfare benefits were introduced for those 
immigrants refusing to participate in courses. Family immigrants were asked to prove 
their language skills before migrating. Since 2005, integration courses have been 
organized at local level (Borkert and Bosswick, 2011). In 2006, the attendance on civic 
integration courses and the successful completion of the language test became required 
also for naturalisation (Joppke, 2007b). In 2007, the ‘Directive Implementation Act for 
EU Directives on Residence and Asylum Issues’ stated, among other things, the 
necessary evidence of basic German skills for spouses, through pre-entry tests. The 
rationale for this provision was to avoid forced marriages and to hinder as much as 
possible the integration process (Borkert and Bosswick, 2011).  
In Spain, the autonomous communities are responsible for the immigrant integration 
programmes. A series of ‘Integration Plans’ have been implemented by Cataluña, 
Madrid and Andalucía since 2001, with the aim of promoting the principles of equal 
treatment, respect for multiculturalism and the protection of cultural plurality. These 
mainly concern orientation, juridical guidance, education and language courses 
(Carrera, 2006). Moreover, two ‘Strategic Plans for Citizenship and Integration’ have 
been approved for the periods 2007-2010 and 2011-14, with the aim of strengthening 
social cohesion and ensuring equal access to public services and participation of all 
citizens. Language courses are among the measures recommended by such plans 
(Pasetti, 2014). 
In United Kingdom the 2002 ‘Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act’ asks 
permanent immigrants and immigrants applying for citizenship to follow English for 
Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL) classes and citizenship courses. 
In 2003, under the Raffarin government, France implemented the ‘Contrat d’accueil et 
de l’intégration’ (CAI) program (transl.: ‘Integration contract’), consisting in one day of 
civic instructions and 500 hours of language course. Then, the first Sarkozy Law of 
2003 decreed the knowledge of the French language and the fundamental values of the 
French Republic as prerequisite to renew the permit of stay and to obtain both the ten-
year residence permit and the legal permanent residence. Moreover, the Law stated that 
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family members were entitle to receive only a one-year permit of stay; then, after two 
years, could apply for the ten-year residence permit. The rationale behind this provision 
was to avoid the increase of ethnic marriages or at least to require family migrants to 
learn French language and values. However, the ‘Contrat d’accueil et de l’intégration’ 
has been made compulsory only starting from 1 January 2007, after the entry into force 
of the 2006 ‘Law of immigration and integration’, also known as the second Sarkozy 
Law. Immigrants eligible and thus required to sign the ‘Contrat d’accueil et de 
l’intégration’ are those who intend to permanently reside in France and thus hold a 
long-term visa or a temporary permit of stay for work, study or family reasons, as well 
as a residence card and the CE long term residence card. Seasonal workers, researchers 
and highly skilled immigrants (in other words, those in possession of the so-called 
‘Carte d’Entrée et de Séjour Compétences et Talents’ (Wihtol de Wenden, 2011)), 
including their families, are exempted from the ‘Contrat d’accueil et de l’intégration’. 
The signature of the ‘Contrat d’accueil et de l’intégration’ includes commitment to six-
hour civic course concerning the fundamental values of the French Republic and the 
functioning of the state; a course which can ranges from one to six hours on access to 
public services and the everyday life in France and a 400-hour French language class for 
those immigrants whose French is considered insufficient. The course is followed by a 
final exam issuing the language certificate.  
In Austria, the ‘Settlement and Residence Act’ establishes the ‘Integration Agreement’. 
It consists of two modules: the first deals with literacy and the second focuses on 
language, social, economic and cultural aspects of life in Austria (Carrera, 2006). 
In Belgium, integration has been a community competence since the 1980s. Therefore, 
policies are different between Wallonia, Flanders and the Region of Brussels. In the last 
ten years, Flanders have been developing civic integration policies with the 
‘Inburgering’ (transl: ‘Citizenisation’) policy which, through an ‘Integration 
Programme’ encourages the learning of the Flemish language, values and norms among 
immigrants. ‘Integration Programmes’ are compulsory for immigrants of 18 years and 
over who are registered in the National Register, are living in a Flemish city and hold a 
first permit of stay of more than three months. The ‘Citizenisation’ policy also includes 
a mandatory ‘Integration Contract’, which allows the immigrant to understand the 
content and structure of the ‘Integration Program’. According to the ‘Integration 
Contract’, the knowledge of the official language is compulsory, as well as the 
internalization of values, norms and institutions of the Flemish society (Mandin, 2014). 
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In Latvia, the 2005 ‘Immigration Law’ has introduced language, tradition and culture 
courses for immigrants applying for a permanent residence permit (Carrera, 2006).   
In Greece, starting from 2006 immigrants who ask for permanent residence permit need 
to earn an annual income of 8,500 Euros (15 percent more for each additional family 
member), to own a healthcare insurance and to pass a language and culture test 
(D’Angelo, 2006). 
In Finland, starting from 2011 the immigrant integration policy has been oriented 
towards the improvement of immigrants’ inclusion into the labour market and the civic 
integration actions are seen as a tool to achieve this goal. The ‘Personal Integration 
Plan’ has been introduced. It represents an ‘agreement’ between the immigrant and 
Finland and it includes language courses, information on the labour market, education, 
schooling for children and healthcare system. All immigrants residing in Finland, over 
18 years and unemployed are eligible and thus required to follow the ‘Personal 
Integration Plan’ (Koskela, 2014). 
In Poland ‘Integration Programs’ are targeted only to refugees and repatriates and their 
familiars. They consist of Polish language instruction, vocational training and 
subsistence support (Stefańska, 2015).  
 
1.6. Civic integration in Italy 
Traditionally an emigration country, Italy turned into an immigration country since the 
late 1970s onwards. Due to its geographical position at the southern border of Europe, 
Italy is one of the most important access points and one of the major immigrant 
destinations in the European Union. The foreign resident population amounted to more 
than 5 million individuals at 1 January 2016 (Istat online database) and it represents 
around 8.3 percent of the total population. This number rises to 6 million (around 10 
percent of the total population), considering non-resident regular and irregular migrants 
(ISMU, 2016).  
As in other ‘new’ immigration countries, the acceptance of the existence of the 
immigration phenomenon has been late and the first law of immigration was introduced 
not until 1986 (Zincone, 1998; Einaudi, 2007). As a consequence, the issue of 
immigrant integration has been formally taken into account and introduced in the Italian 
legislation only with the Single Act of Immigration Law (Law n. 40/1998), also known 
as the Turco-Napolitano Law. The Turco-Napolitano Law was based on four pillars 
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(Zincone and Caponio, 2004: 4): (1) the prevention and fight of illegal entries; (2) the 
regulation of new arrivals of foreign workers through annual quotas of workers and the 
introduction of the so-called ‘sponsor system’, a special settlement permit that allowed 
foreigners to enter Italy to look for a job if they were sponsored by an Italian or a 
foreigner legally resident in Italy who was financially able to do that; (3) the granting of 
basic human rights to illegal immigrants, such as basic healthcare and education; (4) the 
promotion of the integration of immigrants already resident in Italy through the creation 
of a ‘National Integration Fund’ dedicated to finance multicultural activities. These four 
aims corresponded to four basic elements of the so-called ‘model of reasonable 
integration’, “a model which is not too rigid, not too ideological, not too pretentious” 
(Zincone, 2000: 959). The four basic elements were (Zincone, 2000): (1) interaction 
based on security; (2) full integrity for legal immigrants; (3) integrity of human rights 
for illegal immigrants; (4) interaction based on pluralism and communication (Zincone, 
2000). The rationale behind the Turco-Napolitano Law lies in the concept that 
immigrants should benefit of the same civil and in part social rights of nationals. 
Finally, the Turco-Napolitano Law (art. 42) established a ‘multilevel governance’ with 
local authorities in charge of developing and implementing integration actions for their 
immigrant populations.  
The centre-right wing government coalition reformed the Single Act of 1998 through 
the introduction of the Bossi-Fini Law in 2002. In particular, the Bossi-Fini Law 
modified the first two pillars of the Single Act of Immigration Law, making residence 
rights and illegal entries more restrictive. In particular, to discourage permanent 
settlement of immigrants, a series of measures were introduced. The ‘sponsor system’ 
was abolished; the permit of stay was linked to the ‘unified contract of employment and 
residence’ (‘contratto di soggiorno’), with the result that, once the work contract ended, 
the foreigner had to leave the country. The length of the permit of stay depended on the 
length of the work contract, according to an exclusionist interpretation of immigrant 
integration. An amnesty was established by the Bossi-Fini Law for those non-EU 
immigrants who had been working irregularly in Italy for at least three months before 
the law became effective (July 2002). It was the biggest amnesty ever given in Europe: 
646,000 immigrants were regularized under this law (Barbagli et al., 2004; Strozza and 
Zucchetti, 2006). Therefore, the Bossi-Fini Law emphasized the temporary nature of 
immigration and the economic dimension of integration and this trend was maintained 
over the years, as the Flows Decree of 2006 contributed to demonstrate. In 2009, a new 
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amnesty was introduced and it was addressed to domestic care-workers. The reason 
behind this amnesty was that despite the economic crisis the domestic worker sector 
continued to grow and, therefore, to demand foreign workforce (Ambrosini, 2013). 
Finally, the amnesty of 2012 was addressed to irregular non-EU workers and in 
particular to full-time workers and domestic workers, employed at least 20 hours per 
week.  
However, a turn towards the social and cultural dimension of integration has occurred 
also in Italy, as reaction to the above-mentioned international events, which have 
reopened the debate on assimilation and multiculturalism in Europe. The ‘Carta dei 
valori della cittadinanza e dell’integrazione’ (transl.: ‘Charter of the values of 
citizenship and integration’), introduced by the Home Affairs Minister Giuliano Amato 
during the II Prodi Government in 2006, the Security Package (Law 94/2009), approved 
by the IV Silvio Berlusconi Government in July 2009, the 2010 ‘Piano per 
l’integrazione nella sicurezza. Identità e incontro’ (transl.: ‘Plan for integration in secure 
environment. Identity and encounter’) and the ‘Patto per l’integrazione’ (transl.: 
‘Integration agreement’), approved by the same government coalition in 2009, but 
entered into force in March 2012, claimed the importance of learning the Italian 
language and about Italian history and culture as prerequisite for a positive and active 
inclusion of immigrants into the Italian society. In particular, the ‘Integration 
Agreement’ defined integration as “a process designed to promote the coexistence of 
Italian citizens and foreign nationals legally residing in the country, and based on 
mutual commitment to participate in the economic, social and cultural life, under the 
values enshrined in the Italian Constitution” (Official Gazette of the Italian Republic). 
Within these considerations, the ‘Integration Agreement’ asked immigrants who want to 
obtain a permit of stay to learn the Italian language (level A2); to learn the fundamental 
principles of the Italian Constitution and institutions; to learn about civic life, the 
functioning of the health sector, the education and social services sectors, the labour 
market and related fiscal obligations and, last but not least, to respect the rule according 
to which children have to attend school up to 16 years old (Caponio and Zincone, 2011). 
At the moment of the signing the contract, few days after the entry into the Italian 
territory, immigrants receive 16 credits, but then have to score 30 credits within two 
years by attending free courses on civic values (Caneva, 2014). The non-attendance at 
these sessions results in the loss of 15 credits. If the number of credits acquired is more 
than zero but less than 30, or the knowledge of the Italian language, civic culture and 
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civil life cannot be sufficiently proved by the immigrant, the agreement can be extended 
for one more year. A number of credits equivalent to zero or less than zero means the 
denial of the permit of stay and expulsion from Italian territory. Finally, if the number 
of credits acquired is 40 or more, additional cultural and formative activities are offered 
to immigrants. A number of non-profit organizations and institutions organize free 
languages courses for immigrants. Moreover, successfully passing a language test is 
among the requirements asked to immigrants who apply for the ‘EC residence permit 
for long-term residents’ (the permanent residence permit). 
Concluding this section, the Italian centre-left coalition approach towards integration 
appears traditionally quite inclusive and multiculturalist. It tries to equalize as much as 
possible immigrants to Italians as far as social rights are concerned. On the contrary, the 
Italian centre-right coalition considers immigrants as functional to the national 
economy, and therefore mainly as workforce to be employed in those sectors which 
native workers usually refuse (Ambrosini, 2013). Furthermore, the Italian centre-right 
coalition perceives immigrants as a threat when issues of public order, national identity 
and culture are debated (e.g. Geddes, 2008; Salis, 2012). Therefore, from this point of 
view, civic integration has succeeded in conciliating these divergent approaches to 
migration, since the knowledge of the Italian language and values has been considered 
crucial for the process of immigrants’ socio-economic integration by both the 
government coalitions in the last years. In other words, the above mentioned policy 
measures have aligned the two Italian political coalitions, as well as the Italian debate 
on immigrant integration to the ongoing European convergence.  
 
1.7. Discussion and conclusions 
This paper has focused on the civic integration programmes adopted by European 
countries in recent years. The aim has been to shed light on their main features and on 
the rationale that is behind the European convergence towards civic integration. I have 
responded to these research questions by a systematic review of actual legal texts and 
academic literature on 14 European countries. The comparative analysis of the civic 
integration programmes adopted by the European countries covered by my study has 
highlighted: the use of mandatory ‘integration contracts’ for immigrants who ask for a 
permanent residence permit or apply for citizenship; the obligatory participation in 
language and civic courses, especially for refugees and family immigrants; the necessity 
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to pass a final exam and the almost total exemption of high-skilled and temporary 
immigrants from civic integration programmes. Regarding the so-called ‘integration 
from abroad’ or ‘integration at distance’, comparative analysis has shown that only two 
countries, namely the Netherlands and Germany, ask family immigrants to follow civic 
courses in their origin country. Finally, six of the 14 countries analysed, grant local 
voting rights to immigrants.  
Regardless of their national integration philosophies, restrictive measures for granting 
residence and citizenship rights have been endorsed by European countries to 
discourage the entry and the permanent settlement of immigrants. Taken for granted that 
host-country language ability is considered fundamental to enhance social mobility and 
the integration of immigrants into the labour market of the hosting country – recent 
studies have shed light on the positive relationship between socio-economic integration 
and language proficiency (e.g. Di Bartolomeo and Strozza, 2014) – empirical evidence 
shows that policies based on civic requirements have a weak impact on socio-economic 
and political integration of immigrants (Wallace Goodman and Wright, 2015). On the 
contrary, civic integration policies appear to produce a ‘stratification’ of the immigrant 
population in hosting societies. In particular, by building up different integration 
regimes, the civic integration tends to intensify the gap between low-skilled immigrants 
(such as refugees and family migrants, which are those who intend to permanently 
reside in European receiving countries) and high-skilled immigrants (mainly temporary 
immigrants) or between undesirable and desirable migration. For this reason, it can be 
concluded that the European convergence towards civic integration is underpinned by a 
philosophy based on migration control and selection. This philosophy is coherent with 
the EU migration policy ideology, which is marked by a ‘securitization’ approach 
towards migration, as explained at the beginning of this paper. Policy restrictiveness 
and an idea of immigration choisie, with language and civic skills as criteria of 
selection, appear to be at the core of the European civic integration convergence. 
Several studies have shown the limited success of policy restrictiveness (e.g. Vogel, 
2000; Castles, 2004a; 2004b; Cornelius, 2005). Measures aimed to restrict and select 
migration are generally ineffective, since the factors determining and nurturing 
migration processes are very complex and deep-rooted in both origin and destination 
areas (e.g. de Haas, 2010). Moreover, policy restrictiveness contributes to change the 
routes and channels through which people migrate, increasing illegal entries (Cornelius, 
2001; de Haas, 2011). Finally, since it hinders circulation and mobility (Wihtol de 
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Wenden, 1999; 2013; Massey et al., 2015), policy restrictiveness makes more 
precarious the residence of immigrants and fosters their irregularity. Irregular migration 
and the political rhetoric on irregular migration produce feelings of anxiety and fear 
towards immigrants in hosting societies; this undermines the social cohesion and may 
discourage newcomers to adopt and internalize civic values. This vicious circle provides 
evidence not only for the existence of a nexus between immigration and integration 
policies, as stressed before, but also for the fact that restrictive immigration policies and 
effective integration policies based on civic values cannot easily coexist.  
However, active civic participation and anti-discrimination policies are not covered by 
my analysis, therefore this work may appear biased and the analysis on the aim and the 
scope of the civic integration programmes adopted in Europe may be viewed as partial. 
Moreover, it has been argued that a divergence between the national policy-making and 
the local policy implementation may exist when integration policies are concerned 
(Poppelaars and Scholten, 2008; Jørgensen, 2012). Due to “different institutional 
logics” (Poppelaars and Scholten, 2008: 3) and divergent policy needs, civic integration 
programmes may not actually be developed or implemented at local level. Therefore, 
further research is needed in order to gain more insight on these aspects. 
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2. IMMIGRANTS’ CITIZENSHIP STATUS IN EUROPE: THE ROLE OF 
INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS AND NATIONAL POLICIES 
 
2.1. Introduction 
A large body of literature has stressed the role played by citizenship status for 
immigrants’ process of integration into the residence country (e.g. Castles, 1995; 
Joppke, 1999; Koopmans and Statham, 1999; Favell, 2003; Bauböck, 2006). In 
particular, there is general agreement on citizenship status as an objective3 indicator of 
integration (e.g. Portes and Curtis, 1987; Yang, 1994). Citizenship status represents 
only a component of the entire process of integration and, therefore, it does not 
necessarily imply immigrants’ social acceptance and sense of belonging to the hosting 
society (Alba and Foner, 2016). However, by granting the same status and rights of 
natives, citizenship status formally reduces gaps between new and old citizens (Diehl 
and Blohm, 2003), shaping parity between them, which is one of the main goals of the 
integration process (Vink, 2013). 
The acquisition of citizenship status of the new residence country may depend on (1) 
individual characteristics of immigrants, such as demographic, human capital and the 
so-called ‘immigration’ variables (e.g. years since migration, age at arrival and reason 
of migration) (Amit, 2010), (2) structural characteristics of both origin and destination 
countries and (3) institutional factors in the destination country. Among the latter, we 
find policy factors and precisely national citizenship policies, which establish who is 
eligible for naturalization (Peters et al., 2015).  
Although almost all European countries have shifted from a ‘nationalist’ to a more 
‘multiculturalist’ citizenship policy, thus formally liberalizing the access to citizenship 
rights (Joppke, 2007a; 2007b; 2008; 2010; 2012), the chances to obtain the citizenship 
status of the new residence country are still quite limited for many immigrants and their 
descendants in Europe (Howard, 2009). For instance, citizenship eligibility has become 
more difficult because of civic integration requirements, such as mandatory courses, 
tests and contracts for applicants (Wallace Goodman, 2010; 2012). In addition, 
                                                          
3 We can distinguish between objective and subjective indicators of integration. Among the objective 
indicators of integration we find level of educational attainment, household income, employment, 
housing, legal status, etc. Among the subjective indicators of integration, we have self-reported life 
satisfaction, perceived well-being, happiness, perceived financial well-being, self-reported health status, 
perceived discrimination, etc. (OECD/EU, 2015). 
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conditions under which immigrants become naturalized citizens largely vary across 
countries. Indeed, several differences in citizenship rights policies exist in terms of 
residence requirement for naturalization, citizenship by birth, dual citizenship toleration 
and language requirements (e.g. Dronkers and Vink, 2010). These differences take 
origin in structural variations in the implementation of policies and attitudes towards 
immigrants, which mainly depend on countries’ immigration experience and on the 
degree of acceptance of the phenomenon of immigration (Freeman, 1995), which have 
resulted in the institutionalization of different integration regimes and, therefore, in the 
development of the traditional national models of immigration and integration.  
As elucidated in the first paper, the academic literature generally distinguishes among 
four traditional national models of immigration and integration: the exclusionist model, 
the assimilationist model, the multiculturalist or pluralist model and the ‘new’ 
immigration countries model or the Southern European model (e.g. Castles, 1995; 
Favell, 1998; Koopmans and Statham, 1999; Peixoto et al., 2012).  
The exclusionist model of integration (Germany (pre-2000) and Austria) mainly 
considers migration as a short-term phenomenon and, in particular, as a mean to meet 
short labour demands (Gastarbeiter). Countries fitting this model are quite reluctant to 
permanent settlement, family reunification and immigrants’ naturalization. An ethnic 
understanding of nationhood is at the core of citizenship rights and consequently they 
are granted according to the principle of ius sanguinis. For instance, although 1999 Law 
has implemented citizenship by birth in Germany, it implies that children have to 
renounce to the nationality of their parents and to decide between the age of 18 and 23 
(Green, 2005).  
According to the assimilationist model (France and Belgium), immigrants are expected 
to be integrated into the host country primarily as individuals and, therefore, they are 
asked to accept and adopt sincerely the culture and the values of the new residence 
country. Consequently, since it is a distinctive sign of equality (reduction of differences) 
with the mainstreaming society, citizenship status is relatively easy to acquire. It is 
based on a civic and territorial understanding of nationhood and, therefore, on a mixture 
of ius sanguinis and ius soli. For instance, children born in France to foreign parents 
automatically become French when they turn to 18 years old, if they have resided in 
France in the last five years (Weil, 2005). However, at the beginning of 2000s, a shift 
towards anti-discrimination policies has occurred in France, because of some events 
such as riots of young immigrants living in the country, which highlighted the limits of 
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the assimilationist paradigm in integrating immigrants and their descendants (Bertossi, 
2007; Escafré-Dublet, 2014). A pivotal role in this process of policy change has been 
played by the European Union (EU) and in particular by the starting of Tampere 
Programme (1999-2004), which, among other things, asked for a fairer treatment of 
immigrants regularly residing in the EU (Boswell and Geddes, 2011). The rationale 
behind anti-discrimination policies is to alleviate immigrants’ duty to integrate into the 
reception society, by making institutions, such as the school and the labour market more 
responsible for immigrants’ integration, trying to guaranteeing them equity and 
emancipation within the mainstream society. Moreover, as described in the first paper, 
starting from 2007, immigrants have to learn French and demonstrate the knowledge of 
French laws, signing the ‘Contrat d’accueil et de l’intégration’, in order to ask for the 
renewal of their permit of stay and the issue of the permanent residence permit. 
However, these policies have not led to the adoption of a broader multiculturalism, 
which appears still quite distant from the French way of integrating immigrants 
(Lepinard and Simon, 2008). The ban of religious symbols in public buildings and the 
recent decrees against the use of full-body bathing suits (“burkini”) at sea, which have 
been issued by fifteen French municipalities, are two examples of how, in continuity 
with assimilationism, anti-discrimination policies strongly preserve the principle of 
secularism (laïcité). 
At the core of multiculturalism (Britain, the Netherlands and Sweden), there is the idea 
that ethnic minorities’ identity, culture, language and religion should be preserved and 
enhanced. Therefore, countries adopting multiculturalist policies tend to promote ethnic 
particularisms, instead of absorbing them through assimilation within the majority 
group. However, citizenship rights are based on a combination of both ius sanguinis and 
ius soli. For instance, the Dutch Citizenship Act of 1985 established that citizenship 
could be granted to immigrants after 5 years of legal residence and to children at the age 
of 18, if they have lived in the Netherlands continuously since they were born.  
The ‘new’ immigration countries model or the Southern European model (Italy, Greece, 
Portugal and Spain) does not have a strong immigrant integration ideology, because of 
the relatively recent immigration history of countries belonging to this model (mainly 
emigration countries until the mid-1970s, they received mass immigration starting from 
the 1990s) (Freeman, 1995). As consequence, integration policies have not been 
completely institutionalized yet, although they appear rather favourable to immigrants’ 
process of stabilization in society and incorporation into the labour market. Some 
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common features, as far as the management of migration inflows, characterize countries 
embedded in this model (King et al., 2000; Arango and Finotelli, 2010). In particular, 
one can observe the lack of selective immigration policies, a large underground 
economy attracting undocumented immigrants, a strong segmentation of the labour 
market and the use of ex-post instruments to provide a legal status to immigrants, such 
as regularizations, quota systems and flows decrees (Peixoto et al., 2012; Di 
Bartolomeo et al., 2016; Fellini and Fullin, 2016). On the contrary, despite of a rather 
good social acceptance of certain categories of immigrants (Ambrosini, 2013), 
immigrants’ political incorporation and other forms of participation in society tend to be 
quite penalised. Countries fitting this model show some notable differences, especially 
when citizenship policies are considered. For instance, Italian citizenship policy, which 
is mainly based on ius sanguinis (Italian-born foreigners until the age of 18 can apply to 
citizenship within one year of turning 18)4, is one of the most exigent in terms of 
residence requirement (10 years of uninterrupted residence for non-EU citizens, because 
they are considered more culturally distant and, therefore, more difficult to be 
integrated, compared to EU citizens) and one of the most discretional in Europe 
(Sciortino, 2002). On the contrary, Portugal and Spain tend to combine elements of ius 
soli and ius sanguinis, through the introduction of quite limited residence requirement, 
which immigrants have to fulfil to allow their children to acquire the new citizenship 
status. For instance, children born in a Portuguese territory to non-Portuguese parents 
may obtain citizenship rights if the parents have resided in Portugal for five years, or if 
they have completed primary school education in Portugal. Moreover, in Spain, 
immigrants from Latin American countries, Andorra, the Philippines, Equatorial 
Guinea, Portugal and those of Sephardic origin are facilitated in the access to citizenship 
rights (2 years instead of 10 years) (Izquierdo et al., 2002).  
As shown in the first paper, in the last two decades, countries have converged towards 
civic integration policies, which emphasize the importance of the knowledge of the 
language, the culture and the civic values of the hosting society for the entry, the 
residence and the naturalization of immigrants, making boundaries between national 
                                                          
4 The ius scholae or ius culturae, according to which Italian-born foreigners or foreign-born children 
arrived in Italy before the age of 12, can automatically obtain the citizenship status after successfully 
attending elementary education classes or after having completed an educational cycle in Italy is still 
under consideration by the Italian Parliament. At the same time, a partial ius soli (‘ius soli temperato’) has 
also been proposed. It would link the possibility of Italian-born foreigners to acquire the citizenship 
status, if their foreign-born parents hold an ‘EC residence permit for long-term residents’, which is the 
permanent residence permit.  
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policies more blurred compared to the past. However, I argue that, combined with these 
recent policy developments, traditional national models of immigration and integration 
represent a heritage of paramount importance that cannot be neglected when examining 
how both individual and policy factors influence immigrants’ acquisition of citizenship 
status in Europe. In the light of the above considerations, aim of this paper is to examine 
the effect of both individual-level characteristics and measures of national citizenship 
policies on the likelihood of having citizenship status among young and adult 
immigrants living in selected European countries. In particular, my research questions 
are the following: Which factors influence more immigrants’ citizenship status? Do 
national citizenship policies affect citizenship status of immigrants living in European 
countries? Are the traditional national models of immigration and integration helpful in 
interpreting my results?  
The paper is structured as follows. First, an overview of the main individual and policy 
factors explaining citizenship status among immigrants is offered. Second, data, 
measures and method are described, followed by the presentation of the main results of 
the analysis. The paper ends with a discussion on how traditional national models of 
immigration and integration can explain the research findings.  
 
2.2. Explaining citizenship status among immigrants in Europe 
Joppke (2010) has conducted an exploration of the theoretical reflection around 
citizenship and immigration, specifically the aspects of citizenship pertaining 
immigration. He found that citizenship entails status, which is the formal state 
membership, rights, the set of rights distinguishing citizens from residents, and identity, 
the ensemble of values, which ties individuals to the political community. These 
dimensions, which offer a measure of the degree of incorporation of immigrants into the 
receiving society (Bloemraad et al., 2008), can depend on either individual or policy 
factors.  
At individual level, international literature (e.g. Yang, 1994; Piché, 2004; Dronkers and 
Vink, 2010) has highlighted that demographic, human capital and ‘immigration’ 
variables are key factors in explaining the citizenship status of the new residence 
country among immigrants. In particular, as far as the demographic variables are 
concerned, age plays a positive effect on the acquisition of citizenship status: the older 
immigrants are, the higher the likelihood that they will have the citizenship status of the 
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residence country. Females are more likely to acquire the new citizenship status, as 
naturalization implies long-term settlement abroad and this represents a form of 
emancipation from their origin country and its rules (Dronkers and Vink, 2010). Marital 
status is a significant predictor of citizenship status among immigrants (Yang, 1994). In 
particular, higher family stability increases the probability of having the citizenship 
status for two reasons. First, familiar stability is linked to immigrants’ length of 
residence into the new residence country, a requirement that, in combination with other 
factors, such as evidence of social and economic integration and knowledge of the 
national language, is considered important by all naturalization laws, as shown below. 
Second, spouses and children benefit more from immigrants’ duration of residence and 
stabilization into the host society, in terms of chances of family reunification and 
naturalization, compared to immigrants without such a familiar status into the residence 
country. Human capital represents an essential condition for a positive incorporation 
into the host society and it constitutes a fundamental starting point for succeeding into 
the labour market (Schneider and Crul, 2010; Guiraudon, 2014). On this regard, 
evidence shows that education improves socio-economic status and occupational 
attainment of immigrants and their descendants (Di Bartolomeo, 2011; Ali and 
Fokkema, 2015; Baizán and González-Ferrer, 2016), increasing the probability of being 
naturalized (e.g. Koopmans, 2016). Moreover, because of the recent importance 
attributed to the knowledge of the language and civic values of the residence country as 
new requirements that applicants to citizenship have to fulfil (Joopke, 2012) educational 
attainment appears to increase immigrants’ opportunities to have the citizenship status 
of the new residence country. Therefore, highly educated immigrants are expected to be 
more likely to have the citizenship status compared to less educated immigrants. 
Moreover, economic and financial conditions have a significant effect on citizenship 
status among immigrants: the more stable immigrants’ labour and financial conditions 
are, the higher the likelihood that they will have the citizenship status of the new 
residence country. At the same time, the acquisition of the citizenship status can be 
interpreted as a mean to improve immigrants’ stabilization, labour opportunities into the 
residence country and chances of mobility (Massey et al., 2015), especially in times of 
economic recession. Finally, immigrants’ area of origin and cultural similarity, given, 
for instance, by colonial and post-colonial links between origin and residence countries, 
can influence the acquisition of the citizenship status among immigrants (Yang, 1994; 
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Piché, 2004; Cesareo and Blangiardo, 2009). The case of Filipinos and Latin Americans 
living in Spain or in Portugal is an example.  
Concerning the ‘immigration’ variables, the number of years spent into the residence 
country contributes to increase immigrants’ likelihood of being naturalized (Piché, 
2004). Immigrants with a longer duration of residence are less likely to be excluded or 
discriminated at social and economic level and they are generally more likely to have 
established a solid relationship with the host society. Concerning the period of arrival in 
the residence country, it is well acknowledged (e.g. Portes and Zhou, 1993; Portes and 
Rumbaut, 2001; Alba and Nee, 2003) that the age at arrival, or the immigrant generation 
(in literature, they are used interchangeably, since the former is used to disaggregate the 
latter into sub-groups) influences the cultural, political and socio-economic assimilation 
of immigrants (Tran, 2016). In particular, immigrants who migrated at younger ages, 
and therefore socialized in the residence country, have more chances to be better 
integrated, especially in terms of language proficiency, educational attainment, labour 
opportunities and household income, compared to immigrants who migrated at older 
ages (e.g. Rumbaut, 1997; 2004). Status at entry in the residence country, which can be 
considered as a proxy for reason of migration or migration channel, is a predictor of 
immigrants’ likelihood of being naturalized into the residence country. In particular, it 
can predict immigrants’ more or less permanent residence intentions and their more or 
less lasting participation into the labour market of the hosting society, thus influencing 
immigrants’ process of integration and incorporation into the reception society. In sum, 
because they are indicator of assimilation into the residence country, higher education, 
economic status, perceived financial well-being and duration of residence appear to 
increase the likelihood of having the citizenship status among young and adult 
immigrants.  
However, such factors only constitute components, even though important ones, of the 
more comprehensive issue of citizenship status among immigrants in Europe. National 
citizenship policies, which establish the rules to obtain the citizenship status of the 
residence country, are fundamental to complete this picture. In particular, international 
literature (e.g. Bauböck and Helbling, 2001) has highlighted that the residence 
requirement for naturalization, the dual citizenship toleration and policy outcomes, such 
as the naturalization rate and the proportion of foreign citizens (resident population with 
the citizenship of a foreign country) can influence the access to citizenship status. In 
particular, a higher number of years of residence required for naturalization can 
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decrease the likelihood that immigrants will have the citizenship status of the new 
residence country. As indicator of the degree of inclusiveness of immigrants’ receiving 
country and permeability of its material and immaterial boundaries (Howard, 2005; 
Vink, 2013), the dual citizenship toleration, understood as the possibility for naturalized 
citizens to keep their native citizenship, appear to favour the citizenship status among 
newcomers, since it does not change their sense of belonging to the origin country. 
Moreover, as claimed by Howard (2009), the naturalization rate, which measures the 
ratio between the yearly number of naturalizations and the number of foreign citizens 
living in a country, can depend on both the naturalization policy and the demand of 
foreign citizens, which in my view are mutually dependent. Therefore, the higher the 
naturalization rate, the higher the likelihood that immigrants will have the citizenship 
status of the new residence country. Finally, in contrast to the detrimental effect played 
by a high proportion of foreign citizens for the integration process of immigrants, as 
found by Cesareo and Blangiardo (2009), we argue that the proportion of foreign 
citizens positively influences the citizenship status among immigrants, since it means 
openness and inclination of the receiving society in hosting newcomers and potentially 
new citizens.  
 
2.3. Data, measures and method 
2.3.1.  Data sources  
Individual level data stem from the Immigrant Citizens Survey (ICS), conducted by the 
King Baudouin Foundation and the Migration Policy Group, from October 2011 to 
January 2012. 7,468 immigrants were surveyed in the following countries and cities: 
Belgium (Antwerp, Brussels and Liège), France (Lyon and Paris), Germany (Berlin and 
Stuttgart), Hungary (Budapest), Italy (Milan and Naples), Portugal (Faro, Lisbon and 
Setubal) and Spain (Barcelona and Madrid). However, Hungary has been dropped out 
from the sample because it cannot be easily framed in one of the four traditional 
national models of immigration and integration; therefore, the dataset has been reduced 
to 6,255 individuals. The ICS survey aims to reach those: not born in the residence 
country (although immigrated as minors); who are or were non-EU citizens or stateless 
persons (born as citizen of country other than EU/EEA countries or Switzerland); 
residing in the country for more than one year; holding or renewing a legal immigration 
status and being 15 years or older. The survey addresses the following topics: 
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employment; languages; civic and political participation; family reunion; long-term 
residence and citizenship.  
Country-level data come from a systematic review of national citizenship policies, 
academic literature and the Eurostat database. 
 
2.3.2. Individual-level measures: demographic, human capital 
and ‘immigration’ variables 
The key dependent variable is nationality, which is a 0/1 variable where 1 indicates the 
respondent has the citizenship status of the residence country and 0 not. Given previous 
literature, as individual-level independent measures, I have selected the following 
demographic variables: (a) respondents’ age, measured in years, (b) gender, represented 
by the dummy variable male (reference category) and female and (c) marital status, 
distinguishing between ‘legally married or civil union’ (reference category), ‘legally 
separated or divorced or civil union dissolved’, ‘living with my partner’, ‘widowed or 
civil partner died’ and ‘single’. Then, (d) area of origin, distinguishing between ‘Asia’ 
(reference category), ‘Eastern Europe’, ‘Latin America’, ‘Middle East’, ‘North Africa’ 
and ‘Sub-Saharan Africa’ and, finally, (e) cultural similarity, measured by a dummy 
variable (0/1) indicating whether respondent’s origin country is a former colony of 
his/her new residence country. For what concerns the human capital variables, I have 
selected: (f) current economic situation, distinguishing between ‘in paid work’ 
(reference category), ‘in education’, ‘unemployed’, ‘retired or sick or disabled’ and 
‘doing housework or other’, (g) perceived financial well-being, distinguishing between 
‘comfortable’ (reference category), ‘sufficient’, ‘difficult’ and ‘very difficult’ and, 
finally, (h) educational attainment, which refers to the number of years spent in 
education. As ‘immigration’ variables, I have selected first, (i) years since migration, 
which refers to the number of years one lives in the residence country, measured by the 
difference between the year of the interview and the year of arrival in the residence 
country. Second, (l) status at entry, distinguishing between ‘work or study’ (reference 
category), ‘family reunion’, ‘permanent-long term’, ‘humanitarian’, ‘other legal status’ 
and ‘other illegal status’. Third, (m) respondents’ immigrant generation, distinguishing 
between 1st (reference category) and 1.5. In particular, 1st generation means those who 
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have migrated at age older than 17, while 1.5 generation includes those who have 
migrated at age younger than 17, according to a definition given by Rumbaut (1997)5.  
As shown in Table 2.1, the proportion of immigrants holding the citizenship status of 
the residence country largely varies across countries, with Belgium and France being 
the most favourable to grant the citizenship status to immigrants and Italy the least 
favourable.  
 
Table 2.1. Immigrants by citizenship status in six selected residence countries, around 
2011-2012. Percentage values and number of cases 
Immigrants' 
citizenship 
Residence country 
Total 
Belgium France Germany Italy Portugal Spain 
Nationals 47.5 42 15.2 6.6 23.4 38.4 1,810 
Foreigners 52.5 58 84.8 93.4 76.6 61.6 4,445 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
No. of cases 1,024 981 1,201 797 1,258 994 6,255 
% by country 16.4 15.7 19.2 12.7 20.1 15.9 100.0 
Source: Own elaboration on ICS data 
 
I report the definition of the independent individual-level measures along with their 
percentage, mean and standard deviation in Table 2.2. This contributes to shed light on 
the individual characteristics of the respondents. The average age of immigrants 
residing in Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal and Spain is 38.2 years. Females 
represent 51.2%. While the most part of immigrants are married (52.1%), 29.7% are 
single, 7.9% are legally separated, divorced or with a civil union dissolved, 6.9% are 
living with their partner and 2.7 are widowed. Concerning the area of origin, 22.6% of 
immigrants come from Latin America, 16.6% from Eastern Europe, 18.6% from Sub-
Saharan Africa, 16.6% from North Africa, 13.1% from Asia and 11.6% from Middle 
East. It is interesting to highlight that 38% of the respondents’ origin country is a former 
colony of their new residence country. As far as the current economic situation, 57.9% 
have a paid work, 19.1% are unemployed, 9.8% are in education, 7.2% are doing 
housework or other and 5.3% are retired, sick or disabled. Regarding their financial 
well-being, 14.9% of the respondents have a comfortable financial well-being, 45.5% 
                                                          
5 Ruben G. Rumbaut distinguished between 1.25, 1.5 and 1.75 generation, referring to those children who 
immigrate at ages 0-5, 6-12 and 13-17, respectively. 1st generation means those who immigrate at age 
older than 17. We decided to aggregate 1.25, 1.5 and 1.75 in 1.5 generation and compare it to 1st 
generation. 
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sufficient, 25.4% difficult and 12.9% very difficult. Educational attainment is quite high 
and on average equal to 10.7 years of education. When immigration variables are 
considered, the number of years since migration is on average 13.8. On average, three 
out of four respondents are 1st generation immigrants, while one out of four is 1.5-
generation. Moreover, the respondents entered the residence country with the following 
status: 32.5% work or study, 27.9% family reunion, 8.3% permanent-long term, 11.9% 
humanitarian, 12% another legal status and 4.2% other illegal status.  
 
Table 2.2. Descriptive statistics on independent individual-level variables6. Sample of 
immigrants (N = 6,255) in six selected residence countries, around 2011-2012  
Independent variables 
% or 
mean    
and 
(SD) 
  Independent variables 
% or 
mean    
and 
(SD) 
DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES     Current economic situation   
Age (in years) 38.2     - In paid work 57.9 
  (12.5)   
  - Doing housework or 
other 
7.2 
Female 51.2     - In education 9.8 
Marital status       - Retired, sick, disabled 5.3 
  - Legally married, civil union 52.1     - Unemployed 19.1 
  - Legally separated, divorced, civil 
union dissolved 
7.9   Educational attainment 10.7 
  - Living with partner  6.9     (4.4) 
  - Single 29.7   IMMIGRATION VARIABLES   
  - Widowed, civil partner died  2.7   Years since migration  13.8 
Area of origin       (10.6) 
  - Asia 13.1   Immigrant generations   
  - Eastern Europe  16.6     - 1st generation 75.3 
  - Latin America 22.6     - 1.5 generation 24.1 
  - Middle East 11.6   Status at entry   
  - North Africa 16.6     - Work or study  32.5 
  - Sub-Saharan Africa 18.6     - Family reunion 27.9 
Cultural similarity 38.0     - Permanent-long term 8.3 
HUMAN CAPITAL VARIABLES       - Humanitarian 11.9 
Perceived financial well-being       - Other legal status 12.0 
  - Comfortable 14.9     - Other illegal status 4.2 
  - Sufficient  45.5       
  - Difficult 25.4       
  - Very difficult 12.9       
Source: Own elaboration on ICS data 
                                                          
6 The variables marital status, area of origin, perceived financial well-being, current economic situation, 
immigrant generation and status at entry contain missing values. 
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2.3.3. Country-level measures: national citizenship policies 
Consistent with the dimensions of national citizenship policies discussed above, I have 
identified four measures of national citizenship policies. First, the residence 
requirement for naturalization, a continuous variable measuring the number of years 
needed to foreign citizens to naturalize in the new residence country. Second, the dual 
citizenship toleration, a dichotomous variable measuring whether or not foreign citizens 
acquiring the citizenship rights of the new residence country can keep their previous 
citizenship. Third, the naturalization rate, the ratio between the yearly number of 
naturalizations and the number of foreign citizens in a country (Eurostat online 
database, 2011). Finally, the proportion of foreign citizens, a continuous variable 
measuring the number of foreign citizens as a percentage of the total resident population 
(Eurostat online database, 2011). Although it represents one of the key aspects of 
national citizenship policies, I have not taken into account the variable citizenship by 
birth, which measures whether or not children born to parents with a foreign citizenship 
automatically receive the citizenship rights of the country of birth, since the focus of my 
analysis are young and adult immigrants who are not born in the residence country. 
Table 2.3 shows detailed values for these policy variables. 
 
Table 2.3. Measures of national citizenship policies in the six selected countries, around 
2011 
Country No. of years of 
residence 
required for 
naturalization 
Dual 
citizenship 
toleration 
(1=yes; 0=no) 
Naturalization 
rate (in %) 
(2011) 
Proportion (%) 
of foreign 
citizens (2011) 
Belgium 5 1 2.56 11.04 
France 5 1 2.96 6.04 
Germany 8 0 1.52 9.05 
Italy 10 1 1.45 6.82 
Portugal 6 1 5.22 4.14 
Spain 10 1 2.16 11.18 
Source: Own elaboration on various sources 
 
Of the countries represented here, Italy and Spain show the highest number of years 
needed to foreign citizens to naturalize. In particular, 10 years of residence are required 
to non-EU first-generation immigrants who intend to acquire the Italian or the Spanish 
citizenship. Nevertheless, Spain has one the highest levels of naturalization rates and 
proportions of foreign citizens, because of Spanish legislation, which allows some 
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nationalities to acquire citizenship after 2 years of uninterrupted legal residence without 
losing the citizenship of their country of birth, as shown above. However, according to 
the Italian legislation, only 4 years of legal residence are needed to EU citizens. 
Nevertheless, this does not seem to encourage Romanians, the largest immigrant group 
residing in Italy, to ask for the Italian citizenship and, therefore, to contribute to increase 
the Italian naturalization rate, as recently highlighted by Conti and Rottino (2016). With 
8 years of residence needed to naturalization, Germany’s citizenship policy appears to 
be one of the most restrictive in Europe: despite the high proportion of foreign citizens 
(9.05%), Germany has an extremely low naturalization rate (1.52%). On the contrary, 
France and Belgium have the lowest number of years needed to naturalization: for first-
generation immigrants, naturalization is possible after 5 years of residence. However, in 
France applicants have to prove their language ability and sufficient assimilation, the 
latter being part of French Nationality Law since 1945. In the 1950s, sufficient 
assimilation mainly meant basic language knowledge but, in the 1970s, when the 
number of non-European applicants for naturalization increased, sufficient assimilation 
also meant accepting French values (Ersanilli and Koopmans, 2010). Dual citizenship is 
tolerated in all the countries considered by this study, with the exception of Germany, 
where the 1999 reform of citizenship, entered into force in 2000, has formally recalled 
the principle of avoidance of dual citizenship, but it has increased cases of tolerance, 
such as for refugees (Green, 2005). On the contrary, Spain formally has a renunciation 
demand but does not enforce it (Vink, 2013). With 11.04% and 11.18% respectively, 
Belgium and Spain have the highest proportions of foreign citizens.  
 
2.3.4. Method 
As my focus is on immigrants’ citizenship status as the result of both individual and 
policy factors, I have performed a multilevel logistic model, to analyse differences in 
the probability to have citizenship status of the country of residence among young and 
adult immigrants as an outcome of variations in the two different levels of independent 
variables. Level-1 variables are the individual characteristics of immigrants and level-2 
variables are the country characteristics. As well acknowledged (e.g. Goldstein, 1999), 
the multilevel modelling technique is used to assess the effects of macro-level 
characteristics on individuals, because this method uses data in which units at one level 
are clustered within the units at the next higher level. Multilevel modelling allows the 
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“interaction between variables characterizing individuals and variables characterizing 
groups” (Hox, 1995: 1). In other words, it permits the estimation of how covariates at 
different levels affect the outcome variable and how the interactions among these 
covariates affect the outcome variable (Guo and Zhao, 2000). Moreover, as elucidated 
by Khan (1997), through the variance component method, multilevel modelling has the 
advantage, compared to other linear and nonlinear models, “to assess the extent to 
which the variance in the outcome variable is attributable to different levels of 
hierarchy” (1997: 58). Therefore, multilevel modelling enables to measure the extent to 
which the variance in the probability to have the citizenship status of the country of 
residence is attributable to differences in individual characteristics and the extent to 
which the variance is attributable to differences in country characteristics. Finally, 
multilevel modelling allows determining whether group characteristics influence the 
strength of the effects of individual characteristics on the outcome variable. 
 
2.4. Results  
To analyse differences in the likelihood of having citizenship status of the country of 
residence among young and adult immigrants residing in six European countries as an 
outcome of variations in individual and policy factors, I have performed a multilevel 
logistic regression7. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 2.4. However, 
before starting to interpret the odds ratios, it is important to point out that individual- 
and country-level measures have a mutually conditioning effect on the acquisition of 
citizenship status among young and adult immigrants residing in Europe. In particular, 
concerning the individual-level measures, since I have taken into account heterogeneous 
factors, I argue that they can be selective of immigrants who are more prone to acquire 
the citizenship status of the residence country but also that they can produce attitudes 
and values who increase immigrants’ likelihood of acquiring the citizenship status of 
                                                          
7 To test the significance of policy effects, a likelihood ratio test has been carried out, comparing the null 
multilevel model with a null single-level model. The likelihood ratio test statistic is calculated as two 
times the difference in the log likelihood values for the two models. logLik(nm) = -3446.589 (df=2) and 
logLik(ns) = -3762.916 (df=1). LR= 2*(-3446.589 - -3762.916) = 632.654 on 1 degree of freedom 
(because there is only one parameter difference between the models). Bearing in mind that the 5% point 
of a chi-squared distribution on 1 degree of freedom is 3.84, there is overwhelming evidence of policy 
effects on nationality. Moreover, first, I calculated the between-country variance considering the 
dependent variable only, which is equal to 0.780; second, I measured the between-country variance with 
individual variables only, which is equal to 0.843. Third, I measured the between-country variance with 
country level variables only, which is equal to 0.209 and, finally, I measured the between-country 
variance considering individual and country level variables together, which is equal to 0.063.  
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the residence country. However, my data do not allow us to empirically test whether the 
relationship between individual-level measures and the citizenship status is selectivity 
or causal influence (Axinn and Thornton, 1992).  
Findings on gender show that females are more likely to have the citizenship status, 
compared to males. According to international literature (e.g. Itzigsohn and Giorguli-
Saucedo, 2005), females are more likely to experience a positive incorporation into the 
host society, compared to their male counterpart, and therefore they are more likely to 
intend to permanently remain in the residence country. Conversely, a possible return to 
the origin country may signify the loss of independence and equality gained in the 
receiving country, which would entail the readjustment of their traditional roles. As far 
as marital status, results show that single, living with partner, legally separated, 
divorced or with dissolved civil union immigrants are less likely to have the citizenship 
status, compared to married or in civil union immigrants. Literature has highlighted the 
positive association between family stability and naturalization (e.g. Yang, 1994). In 
particular, family stability reveals the presence of social capital (i.e. family networks), 
more contacts within the residence country, a long-term and stable residence, less 
intention to return to the origin country and, therefore, a successful process of 
integration into the residence country (e.g. Piracha et al., 2013). Concerning the area of 
origin, immigrants coming from Sub-Saharan, Latin American and Eastern European 
countries appear to be the most likely to have the citizenship status of the new residence 
country. A special regime for naturalization provided to Latin Americans, ethno-cultural 
and geographical proximity to the origin country for both Latin Americans and Eastern 
Europeans (Yang, 1994; Piché, 2004; Cesareo and Blangiardo, 2009), but also more 
deprived and precarious life conditions at the origin, such those characterizing 
immigrants coming from Sub-Saharan countries, are relevant factors explaining this 
result. Similarly, immigrants coming from a country that is a former colony of their new 
residence country appear to be more likely to have the citizenship status of the new 
residence country, compared to immigrants coming from a country that is not a former 
colony of their new residence country. Cultural similarity, which depend on colonial 
and post-colonial ties between origin and residence countries, which “make the former 
colonial state a preferred destination for people from the former colonies” (Vezzoli and 
Flahaux, 2016: 3), can imply the use of the same language for foreign and native 
citizens. This can help reducing risks of social marginalization and economic and 
professional segregation, increasing, for example, the chances of being employed in 
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medium and high-skilled jobs and, more in general, of having a successful path of 
integration into the new residence country. 
As far as the human capital variables, findings for the current economic situation show 
that immigrants who are doing housework or other and are retired, sick or disabled are 
less likely to be naturalized, compared to those who are employed. This result can be 
interpreted in the light of the neoclassical theory of migration (e.g. Sjaastad, 1962; 
Todaro, 1969), according to which immigrants who are not employed face more 
problems in actualizing their immigration and integration goals and, therefore, they are 
less equipped to apply for and obtain the citizenship status of the new residence country. 
As predictable, a worse perceived financial well-being decreases immigrants’ likelihood 
of having the citizenship status of the new residence country. Perceived financial well-
being is a subjective indicator of integration that can be considered as a proxy for 
income and labour market participation, which affects immigrants’ legality and mobility 
in the residence country (Sacchetto and Vianello, 2016). In particular, income and 
labour market participation can influence immigrants’ capability to stabilize themselves 
in the host country, in terms of legal residence and stable labour conditions (Morris, 
2001), as well as their chances of becoming part of the host society and, therefore, 
enjoying the citizenship rights. Moreover, a proper annual income can be a prerequisite 
for naturalization, as in the case of Italy (Paparusso et al., 2016). Education plays a 
positive effect on immigrants’ citizenship status: immigrants that are more educated are 
more likely to have citizenship status, compared to less educated immigrants. This 
result provides evidence for the position in the European public debate, which argues 
that the acquisition of citizenship rights should be only granted to immigrants who can 
demonstrate to have completed the integration process, fulfilling high integration 
requirements, such as high educational and professional careers (Schneider and Crul, 
2010; Crul et al., 2012). 
As far as the ‘immigration’ variables are concerned, the number of years since 
migration shapes immigrants’ likelihood of naturalization, as Peters et al. (2015) have 
recently highlighted. Therefore, the more years they are living in the residence country, 
the higher the likelihood that they will have the citizenship status. Moreover, 1.5-
generation immigrants are more likely to have citizenship status, compared to 1st 
generation immigrants. This result provides evidence for the literature on integration 
studies, which argue that immigrants who arrived at younger ages are more integrated 
into the residence country, compared to immigrants who arrived at older ages (Portes 
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and Rumbaut, 2001). Indeed, immigrant generation is considered a crucial component 
of the integration process (Piché, 2004; Tran, 2016). In particular, previous studies 
show that to migrate at young ages can facilitate the process of incorporation, increase 
sense of belonging and political participation to the host society and encourage the 
acquisition of citizenship status of the new residence country (e.g. Portes and Rumbaut, 
2001). Coming to the status at entry, results show that family migrants are the most 
likely to acquire citizenship status. Family reunification is a “key source of 
immigration” (Bosswick and Heckmann, 2006: 19). In particular, it is one of the major 
entry channels for European countries, especially for Mediterranean countries (Reyneri, 
2001). Family reunification generally implies immigrants’ intention to permanently 
settle into the new residence country, as they migrated to join their family members. 
Moreover, family formation facilitates the naturalization of immigrants and their 
descendants in European countries. Humanitarian immigrants also have a strong 
motivation to acquire the citizenship status of the residence country: it could give them 
more safety and freedom of movement, considering that they had to leave their country 
for safety reasons. 
When policy factors are considered, results show that the residence requirement for 
naturalization decreases the likelihood of acquiring citizenship status among immigrants 
residing in European countries. A higher number of years of residence required for 
naturalization can deter immigrants’ desire to apply for citizenship status and hinder the 
chances of obtaining it. Conversely, the dual citizenship toleration into the residence 
country increases the likelihood of having the citizenship status among immigrants, 
since they are not forced to renounce to their previous citizenship and, therefore, to 
challenge their relationship and sense of belonging to the origin country, including the 
autonomy and freedom of returning or travelling without constraints (Massey et al. 
2015). Concerning the naturalization rate and the proportion of foreign citizens, results 
show a positive effect on the likelihood of acquiring the citizenship status, since they 
are synonymous of residence countries that are inclusive and proactive towards 
immigrants and their descendants.  
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Table 2.4. Multilevel logistic regression with dependent variable nationality (N = 6,255) 
Independent variables 
Odds 
ratios 
Significance  
DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES   
Age  1.007  
Female (ref. cat. = male) 1.264 ** 
Marital Status (ref. cat. = legally married or civil union)   
  - Legally separated, divorced, civil union dissolved  0.937  
  - Living with partner  0.496 *** 
  - Single 0.758 ** 
  - Widowed, civil partner died  1.076  
Area of origin (ref. cat. = Asia)   
  - Eastern Europe  1.546 ** 
  - Latin America 1.439 * 
  - Middle East 0.968  
  - North Africa 1.076  
  - Sub-Saharan Africa 1.573 ** 
Cultural similarity 1.534 ** 
HUMAN CAPITAL VARIABLES   
Current economic situation (ref. cat. = in paid work)   
  - Doing housework or other  0.731 * 
  - In education 0.862  
  - Retired, sick, disabled 0.532 *** 
  - Unemployed 0.917  
Perceived financial well-being (ref. cat. = comfortable)   
  - Sufficient   0.728 ** 
  - Difficult 0.755 * 
  - Very difficult 0.520 *** 
Educational attainment (in years) 1.057 *** 
IMMIGRATION VARIABLES   
Years since migration  1.091 *** 
1.5 generation (ref. cat. = 1st generation) 1.702 *** 
Status at entry (ref. cat. = work or study)   
  - Family reunion 1.451 *** 
  - Permanent-long term 1.084  
  - Humanitarian 1.147  
  - Other legal status 0.877  
  - Other illegal status 0.599 *** 
NATIONAL CITIZENSHIP POLICIES   
No. of years of residence required for naturalization 0.818 *** 
Dual citizenship toleration 2.127 * 
Naturalization rate  1.452 *** 
Proportion of foreign citizens 1.350 *** 
Significance: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
Source: Own elaboration on ICS data 
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2.5. Discussion and conclusions 
Aim of this work has been to examine the effect of both individual characteristics and 
measures of national citizenship policies on the likelihood of having citizenship status 
among young and adult immigrants living in European countries. In particular, my 
research questions have been the following: Which factors influence more immigrants’ 
citizenship status? Do national citizenship policies affect citizenship status of 
immigrants living in European countries? Are the traditional national models of 
immigration and integration helpful in interpreting my results? I have responded to 
these research questions by performing a multilevel logistic regression on selected 
European countries. 
The analysis has highlighted the strong effect of individual characteristics on citizenship 
status. In particular, as synonyms of a consolidated process of integration into the 
residence country, higher family stability, educational attainment, current economic 
situation, perceived financial well-being, duration of residence and cultural similarity 
with the origin country appear to increase the likelihood of having the citizenship status 
among immigrants living in Europe. However, this effect is mediated by policy factors. 
In particular, a lower residence requirement for naturalization and a more inclusive 
environment help immigrants in the process of becoming citizens of the new residence 
country. These conditions seem to characterize countries belonging to the French model 
of integration, where there is a more balanced relationship between a low number of 
years of residence required for naturalization, the dual citizenship toleration and 
relatively high naturalization rates and proportions of foreign citizens, compared to 
other countries. Therefore, this seems to be an optimal mix for promoting the 
acquisition of citizenship status among young and adult immigrants. Indeed, the 
acquisition of citizenship status for immigrants perfectly reflects the French model of 
integration, according to which “members of some cultural community abandon at least 
some of their customs and practices” (Mason, 1999: 266). The use of the French 
‘Contrat d’accueil et de l’intégration’ introduced by the first Sarkozy Law of 2003, but 
made compulsory in 2007 after the second Sarkozy Law, and the ‘Integration Contract’ 
recently included in the Belgian ‘Citizenisation’ policy proves that the introduction of 
civic requirements has not been questioned by the shift from assimilationist to anti-
discrimination policies. However, immigrants become more alike to natives not just 
through the adoption of similar social, economic and cultural behaviours, but also 
through the acquisition of same rights and duties. In this regard, citizenship status helps 
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to reduce differences among foreign citizens and natives, which marks the integration 
paradigm. Conversely, a “subordinate integration” (Ambrosini, 2001), mainly restricted 
to some segments of the labour market, where there is a strong demand of unskilled and 
precarious jobs, which characterizes Southern European and exclusionist countries, does 
not comply (yet) with the process of granting to immigrants the same civil and political 
participation of natives, which distinguishes the citizenship status.  
This study has some limitations, because it does not allow taking into account the 
behaviour of multiculturalist countries for what concerns the concession of citizenship 
rights to immigrants. The academic literature (e.g. Duyvendak and Scholten, 2011; 
Kymlicka, 2012) has recently shed light on the debate about the effectiveness of 
multiculturalism to achieve its intended effects, especially in granting immigrants 
equality and emancipation (Koopmans, 2010). In particular, a research strand argues 
that since they emphasize ethnic and cultural particularisms, multicultural policies risk 
of “reinforcing ethnic stratification and ethno-cultural conflict” (Bosswick and 
Heckmann, 2006: 5), producing isolation and discouraging the process of reducing gaps 
between nationals and non-nationals. These considerations point to the need for more 
detailed analysis of how the acquisition of citizenship rights works in a multiculturalist 
context.   
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3. STUDYING IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION THROUGH SELF-
REPORTED LIFE SATISFACTION IN THE RESIDENCE COUNTRY: 
EVIDENCE FOR SEVEN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Immigrant integration has been defined as the ensemble of the “processes that increase 
the opportunities of immigrants and their descendants to obtain the valued ‘stuff’ of a 
society, as well as social acceptance, through participation in major institutions such as 
the educational and political system and the labour and housing markets” (Alba and 
Foner, 2016: 5). The academic literature unanimously recognizes these processes as 
dynamic, multidimensional and two-way that involve, at the same time and by the same 
measure, the receiving society and the newcomers (Penninx, 2004; Piché, 2004; 
Cesareo and Blangiardo, 2009). The complexity and the multi-dimensionality of these 
processes has led analysts and researchers to take into account a multiplicity of factors, 
such as the demographic characteristics of immigrants, the human capital variables and 
the so-called ‘immigration variables’ (Amit, 2010), which are variables pertaining the 
migration process as a whole (e.g. years since migration, period of arrival, reason of 
migration). Moreover, as far as the assessment of integration outcomes, several scholars 
have tried to examine the effect of different integration paradigms (e.g. assimilation, 
acculturation, multiculturalism and mandatory integration) on immigrants’ 
socioeconomic, sociocultural and political integration using ad hoc indicators (e.g. 
Ersanilli and Koopmans, 2010; Maxwell, 2010; Ersanilli and Koopmans, 2011; 
Maxwell, 2012; Wright and Bloemraad, 2012; Koopmans, 2013; Wallace Goodman and 
Wright, 2015; Koopmans, 2016). Despite the remarkable contribution of these works to 
integration studies, it has been concluded that to understand integration is not sufficient 
to investigate only its ‘objective’ forms (e.g. educational attainment, household income, 
employment, housing, legal status, etc.). Instead, one must also study ‘subjective’ 
integration (Amit, 2010; Neto, 1995; 2011), using immigrants’ self-reported life 
satisfaction, in order to take into account their perceptions and opinions about their 
experience into the residence country. Life satisfaction has been defined as “a global 
assessment of a person’s quality of life according to his chosen criteria” (Shin and 
Johnson, 1978, cit. in Dieder et al., 1985: 71). Due to its common use in estimating the 
“apparent quality of life within a country or a specific social group” (Veenhoven, 1996: 
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3), immigrants’ self-reported life satisfaction can be used to evaluate the integration 
process into the residence country. For example, Angelini et al. (2015) studied the 
association between immigrants’ self-reported life satisfaction and cultural assimilation 
in Germany. In particular, they showed that the positive effect of cultural assimilation 
on immigrants’ subjective well-being is stronger for established and second-generation 
immigrants than for immigrants that are more recent. Safi (2010) demonstrated that 
perceived discrimination negatively affects immigrants’ self-reported life satisfaction; in 
particular, the grade of self-reported life satisfaction decreases among ethnic groups 
facing discrimination in the residence country. A higher self-reported life satisfaction 
underlies a successful and long-term residence abroad. The analysis of Massey and 
Akresh (2006) revealed, indeed, that more satisfied immigrants are more likely to intend 
to naturalize and permanently settled in the U.S. compared to less satisfied immigrants. 
In their view, immigrants’ intention to acquire the citizenship status and to remain in the 
residence country are synonyms of a positive integration process. Finally, in their 
analysis of Somali women in Melbourne, McMicheal and Manderson (2004) concluded 
that weak social capital and social networks negatively affect women’s self-reported life 
satisfaction. Within these considerations, this paper aims to contribute to this strand of 
research, using self-reported life satisfaction to assess immigrants’ integration into the 
residence country. In particular, I intend to measure the effect of demographic, human 
capital and ‘immigration’ variables on the self-reported life satisfaction of young and 
adult immigrants residing in seven European countries, using the Immigrant Citizens 
Survey (ICS). The paper is structured as followed: Section 3.2 discusses the main 
determinants of self-reported life satisfaction. Section 3.3 describes data and 
operationalization. In section 3.4, I present the results and I conclude in Section 3.5. 
 
3.2. The main determinants of self-reported life satisfaction in the 
residence country  
Many studies investigated the determinants of immigrants’ self-reported life satisfaction 
in the residence country, finding an association between life satisfaction and 
immigrants’ individual characteristics, such as demographic and human capital 
variables, on the one hand, and ‘immigration’ variables, on the other (e.g. Fugl-Meyer 
et al., 2002; Bonini, 2008; Amit, 2010; Safi, 2010). While results for gender are not 
very clear-cut, empirical evidence shows that the effect of age on immigrants’ life 
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satisfaction is not linear (e.g. Bartram, 2013; D’Isanto et al., 2016; Schalembier, 2016). 
Marital status appears to be a significant predictor of life satisfaction: immigrants 
engaged in a stable relationship express significantly higher levels of satisfaction with 
life, compared to those without such a status (Fugl-Meyer et al., 2002). Economic and 
financial conditions also have a significant effect on life satisfaction: immigrants with a 
more stable labour and economic conditions show higher levels of life satisfaction 
compared to those immigrants with labour and economic conditions that are more 
precarious (Amit, 2010; D’Isanto et al., 2016). Education also plays a significant role on 
immigrants’ life satisfaction: education improves social relationships and labour market 
opportunities and, therefore, it increases well-being (e.g. Koopmans, 2016). Therefore, 
highly educated immigrants are expected to express higher level of life satisfaction, 
compared to less educated immigrants. However, it cannot be neglected that over-
qualified immigrants can express less satisfaction with life due to the difficulty of 
finding a proper occupation in the residence country (e.g. Massey and Akresh, 2006; 
Fullin and Reyneri, 2010).  
Concerning the ‘immigration’ variables, the number of years spent in the residence 
country contributes to improve immigrants’ life satisfaction (Piché, 2004; Cela et al., 
2013). Indeed, a higher number of years since migration is expected to strength the 
socio-economic position of immigrants, as well as their legal status in the residence 
country and both are predictors of high life satisfaction. Concerning the period of arrival 
in the residence country, it is well acknowledged that immigrants who have migrated at 
younger ages, and therefore have socialized in the residence country, have more chances 
to be better integrated, especially in terms of language proficiency, educational 
attainment, labour opportunities and household income, compared to immigrants who 
have migrated at older ages (e.g. Rumbaut, 1997; 2004). Legal status has been defined 
as “the rights afforded or denied by the state to individuals residing in its territory” 
(Söhn, 2014: 3). On legal status, can depend the civil, social and political rights (i.e. 
receipt of welfare benefits, political participation and representation) enjoyed by 
immigrants and their families, the access and the permanence into the labour market, the 
possibility to apply for and obtain a long-term residence permit or the citizenship of the 
residence country (Bauböck, 2006; Morris, 2001; Cangiano, 2014). A more permanent 
legal status confers a more stable stay in the residence country, a more lasting 
participation into the labour market, more public resources and a higher social capital 
(Vertovec, 2007), thus improving immigrants’ life satisfaction and integration. 
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Therefore, based on previous literature, I formulate the following research hypotheses. 
(1) I expect younger and older immigrants be more satisfied with life and, therefore, 
more integrated into the residence country. (2) I moreover expect that immigrants with 
higher family stability, better labour and economic conditions and higher educational 
attainment will show higher levels of life satisfaction and, therefore, be more integrated 
into the residence country. (3) I also expect to find an association between immigrants’ 
level of life satisfaction, and therefore of their integration, and their area of origin. As 
claimed by Maxwell (2012), integration is not a unique and homogenous process and 
not all immigrant groups perform in the same way. Immigrants’ background and 
precisely their area of origin can have an impact on immigrants’ integration outcomes 
into the residence country. For instance, the area of origin can affect the likelihood of 
obtaining the citizenship of the residence country, depending on whether or not origin 
countries tolerate dual citizenship (Vink, 2013), or contribute to produce the so-called 
‘ethnic penalties’, which are forms of discrimination at work, because of cultural 
distance between immigrants and natives (Koopmans, 2016). In particular, ethno-
cultural (e.g. former colonial ties, common history, use of the same language and 
practicing the same religion), social and economic (e.g. type of family organization, 
labour market structure and level of economic development) similarity, including 
geographical proximity, between the country of origin and the country of residence 
(Yang, 1994; Piché, 2004) can increase immigrants’ satisfaction with life and facilitate 
their process of integration into the new residence country. Specifically, “countries that 
have been colonies or dependencies of more-developed countries tend to retain a special 
relationship with the colonizing country, since many residents of such countries speak 
the language of the colonizer and immigrants from the former colony are often given an 
advantage in applying for permanent resident status” (Wanner, 2011: 16). Therefore, I 
make the hypothesis (4) that immigrants coming from a country which is a former 
colony of his/her new residence country will be more satisfied with life, and therefore 
more integrated, compared to immigrants coming from a country which is not a former 
colony of his/her new residence country. In addition, according to previous research, 
which has demonstrated the positive process of integration of immigrants coming from 
Latin American countries and the comparative advantageous position in the labour 
market of immigrants coming from East Europeans countries (e.g. Cesareo and 
Blangiardo, 2009; Khattab and Fox, 2016), I make the hypothesis (5) that Latin 
Americans and East Europeans will be more satisfied with life, and, therefore, be more 
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integrated into the residence country, compared to immigrants coming from other 
countries. (6) I furthermore expect that the higher the number of years spent in the 
residence country and the more permanent the legal status, the higher the levels of 
immigrants’ life satisfaction and, therefore, the higher the level of their integration. 
Finally, institutional factors and in particular immigration and integration policies can 
contribute to affect immigrants’ level of life satisfaction and, therefore, their integration 
into the residence country (e.g. Martin, 1994; Penninx, 2003; Büchel and Frick, 2005). 
(7) I thus expect to find differences among residence countries. 
 
3.3. Data, method and operationalization  
My study draws on the Immigrant Citizens Survey (ICS), conducted by the King 
Baudouin Foundation and the Migration Policy Group, from October 2011 to January 
2012, with the aim to ask immigrants themselves how they experienced integration 
policies (www.immigrantsurvey.org). 7,468 immigrants were surveyed in the following 
countries and cities: Belgium (Antwerp, Brussels and Liège), France (Lyon and Paris), 
Germany (Berlin and Stuttgart), Hungary (Budapest), Italy (Milan and Naples), Portugal 
(Faro, Lisbon and Setubal) and Spain (Barcelona and Madrid). The ICS survey aims to 
reach those: not born in the residence country (although immigrated as minors); who are 
or were non-EU citizens or stateless persons (born as citizen of country other than 
EU/EEA countries or Switzerland); residing in the country for more than one year; 
holding or renewing a legal immigration status and being 15 years or older. The survey 
addresses the following topics: employment; languages; civic and political participation; 
family reunion; long-term residence and citizenship.  
To test my research hypotheses, I have performed ordered logistic regression models. 
Ordered logistic regression is an extension of the binary logistic regression used when 
the response variable has ordered categorical values. One of main assumptions 
underlying ordered logistic regression is that the relationship between each couple of 
outcome groups is the same. In other words, ordered logistic regression assumes that the 
coefficients describing the relationship between the lowest and all higher categories of 
the response variable are the same as those describing the relationship between the next 
lowest category and all higher categories (Brant, 1990). This is known as the 
‘proportional odds assumption’. Ordered logistic regression appears very suitable to be 
employed when analysing subjective indicators, such as self-reported life satisfaction, 
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happiness, perceived well-being or self-reported health status, since they are generally 
measured on an ordinal scale (Baker et al., 2005; Bowling et al., 2006; Lim and 
Putnam, 2010). I have used the following variables in the analysis. 
 
3.3.1.  Self-reported life satisfaction 
As dependent variable, I have analysed immigrants’ self-reported life satisfaction. 
Respondents were asked the following question: could you please tell me on a scale of 0 
to 10 how satisfied you are with each of the following items, when 0 means you are 
very dissatisfied and 10 means you are very satisfied? The items were the following: 
‘your life these days’, ‘your present level of education’, ‘your present job’, ‘your 
accommodation’, ‘your family life’, ‘your health’ and ‘your social life’. The ICS survey 
does not provide an item that rates satisfaction with life as a whole, as the literature 
recommends when measuring life satisfaction (Diener, 1984; Diener et al., 1985; 1993). 
Nevertheless, as suggested by Bonini (2008), the item ‘your life these days’ can be used 
as synthetic indicator of life satisfaction8. Before performing the ordered logistic 
regressions, I have used a predictive mean matching method to impute the missing data 
contained in the variable ‘your life these days’. 
 
3.3.2.  Demographic, human capital and ‘immigration’ variables 
Given previous literature and my research hypotheses, I have operationalized several 
independent variables. Among the demographic variables, I have selected (a) 
respondents’ age, measured in years; (b) age squared; (c) gender, represented by the 
dummy variable male (reference category) and female and (d) marital status, 
distinguishing between ‘legally married or civil union’ (reference category), ‘legally 
separated or divorced or civil union dissolved’, ‘living with my partner’, ‘widowed or 
civil partner died’ and ‘single’. Then, (e) area of origin, distinguishing between ‘Asia’ 
(reference category), ‘Eastern Europe’, ‘Latin America’, ‘Middle East’, ‘North Africa’ 
and ‘Sub-Saharan Africa’ and finally, (f) cultural similarity, measured by a dummy 
variable (0/1) indicating whether respondent’s origin country is a former colony of 
                                                          
8 I have also performed an ordered logistic regression model on each of the other dimensions of life 
satisfaction and therefore on ‘your present level of education’, ‘your accommodation’, ‘your family life’, 
‘your health’ and ‘your social life’, in order to account for all these aspects. I have not considered ‘your 
present job’, because of the large number of missing data, which are due to the unemployed, which are 
not supposed to answer. Results are displayed in the Appendix.  
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his/her new residence country (for instance, the Spanish-speaking countries of Latin 
America for Spain and Brazil for Portugal) or not (reference category). For what 
concerns the human capital variables, I have selected (g) current economic situation, 
distinguishing between ‘in paid work’ (reference category), ‘in education’, 
‘unemployed’, ‘retired or sick or disabled’, ‘doing housework or other’; (h) perceived 
financial well-being, distinguishing between ‘comfortable’ (reference category), 
‘sufficient’, ‘difficult’ and ‘very difficult’ and (i) educational attainment, which refers 
to the number of years spent in education. For the so-called ‘immigration’ variables, I 
have selected three variables. First, (l) years since migration, which refers to the number 
of years one lives in the residence country, measured by the difference between the year 
of the interview and the year of arrival in the residence country. Second, (m) years since 
migration squared. Third, (n) respondents’ immigrant generation, distinguishing 
between 1st (reference category) and 1.5. In particular, 1st generation means those who 
migrated at age older than 17, while 1.5 generation includes those who migrated at age 
younger than 17. Forth, (o) legal status, distinguishing between ‘work or study’ 
(reference category), ‘family reunion’, ‘permanent/long term residence permit’, 
‘humanitarian’, ‘other legal status’ and ‘national’. Among the modalities considered by 
this variable, there are different categories of residence permit, which can determine 
specific sets of rights and conditions for immigrants who hold them. Finally, I have 
included the (p) residence country, distinguishing between Belgium (reference 
category), France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Portugal and Spain.  
 
3.4. Results  
3.4.1.  Descriptive results  
The definition of variables along with their percentages, means and standard deviation 
are displayed in Table 3.1. The average age of immigrants residing in Belgium, France, 
Germany, Hungary, Italy, Portugal and Spain is 38.6 years old. Females represent 
around 51% of the total sample. While the most part of immigrants are married (52.3%), 
29.3% are single, 7.7% are legally separated, divorced or with a civil union dissolved, 
6.4% are living with their partner and 3.2% are widowed. Concerning the area of origin, 
21.9% of immigrants come from Eastern Europe, 18.9% from Latin America, 16.2% 
from Asia, 15.8% from Sub-Saharan Africa, 14.3% from North Africa and 11.4% from 
Middle East. It is interesting to note that 31.8% of the respondents’ origin country is a 
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former colony of their new residence country. As far as the current economic situation 
is concerned, 57% of the respondents have a paid work, 16.8% are unemployed, 10.8% 
are in education, 7.4% are doing housework or other and 6.8% are retired, sick or 
disabled. Regarding their financial well-being, 17.1% of the respondents have a 
comfortable financial well-being, 24% difficult, 45.1% sufficient and 11.9% very 
difficult. Educational attainment is quite high and on average equal to 10.84 years. 
When immigration variables are considered, the number of years since migration is on 
average 14.4. On average, three out of four respondents are 1st generation immigrants, 
while one out of four is 1.5-generation. Moreover, 31.8% of the respondents hold a 
permanent/long-term residence permit, 31.4% are national, 22.6% have a work or study 
status, 7.4% have family reunion, 2.7% have a humanitarian status and 3% have other 
legal status and. Finally, 13.8% is living in Belgium, 13.2% in France, 16.1% in 
Germany; 16.1% in Hungary, 10.7% in Italy; 16.9% in Portugal and 13.3% in Spain. 
 
Table 3.1. Descriptive statistics on independent variables9. Sample of immigrants (N = 
7,468) in seven residence countries, around 2011-2012  
Independent variables 
% or 
mean    
and 
(SD) 
  Independent variables 
% or 
mean    
and 
(SD) 
DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES     
Perceived financial well-
being 
  
Age (in years) 38.6     - Comfortable 17.1 
  (13.4)     - Sufficient  45.1 
Female 50.9     - Difficult 24 
Marital status       - Very difficult 11.9 
  - Legally married, civil union 52.3   Educational attainment 10.9 
  - Legally separated, divorced, civil 
union dissolved 
7.7     (4.5) 
  - Living with partner  6.4   IMMIGRATION VARIABLES   
  - Single 29.3  Years since migration  14.4 
  - Widowed, civil partner died  3.2    (11.8) 
Area of origin    Immigrant generations   
  - Asia 16.2     - 1st generation 74.9 
  - Eastern Europe  21.9     - 1.5 generation 24.6 
  - Latin America 18.9   Legal status    
  - Middle East 11.4     - Work or study  22.6 
                                                          
9   The variables marital status, area of origin, current economic situation, perceived financial well-being, 
immigrant generation and legal status contain missing values. 
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  - North Africa 14.3     - Family reunion 7.4 
  - Sub-Saharan Africa 15.8     - Humanitarian 2.7 
Cultural similarity 31.8     - National 31.4 
HUMAN CAPITAL VARIABLES       - Other legal status 3 
Current economic situation     
  - Permanent/long-term 
residence permit 
31.8 
  - In paid work 57    Residence country   
  - Doing housework or other 7.4   - Belgium 13.8 
  - In education 10.8   - France 13.2 
  - Retired, sick, disabled 6.8   - Germany 16.1 
  - Unemployed 16.8   - Hungary 16.1 
    - Italy 10.7 
    - Portugal 16.9 
   - Spain 13.3 
Source: Own elaboration on ICS data 
 
3.4.2. Regression results  
To ascertain the contributions of demographic, human capital and so-called 
‘immigration’ variables, I have carried out three ordered logistic regression models, 
where demographic variables have been first introduced (Model 1), then human capital 
variables (Model 2) and finally ‘immigration’ variables (Model 3). The results of these 
analyses are presented in Table 3.2.  
The variables that contribute significantly to the model are age, age squared, gender, 
marital status and area of origin. Age has a negative effect on immigrants’ life 
satisfaction: the older immigrants are, the lower their level of satisfaction with life. 
However, additional analysis suggests that this effect is not linear: age squared is 
positive. Thus, when immigrants get older, the negative effect of age is reduced. As 
mentioned before, this result finds evidence in the international literature, according to 
which younger and older immigrants report higher levels of life satisfaction (e.g. Safi, 
2010; Bartram, 2013; D’Isanto et al., 2016). Therefore, this result verifies the first 
research hypothesis. Females are more satisfied with life compared to males. As I have 
argued in the first paper, females are more likely to be successfully integrated into the 
host country, compared to males, and therefore they are more likely to express higher 
satisfaction with life into the residence country. As far as marital status, results show 
that married or in civil union immigrants are more satisfied with life, compared to those 
who live with partner, are legally separated, divorced or with a civil union dissolved and 
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are widowed. Literature has highlighted the positive association between being married 
and being satisfied with life (e.g. Diener et al., 1999). Although with many individual 
(Diener et al., 2006) and contextual (Wadsworth, 2016) differences, being married 
increases life satisfaction, at least on the short term. Indeed, marriage provides 
emotional, psychological, material and physic support, especially at elderly stages of 
life (Chipperfield and Havens, 2001). Especially among immigrants, being married can 
be a predictor of more social capital (i.e. family networks); it can also reveal a long-
term residence abroad and, therefore, a successful process of integration into the 
residence country (e.g. Piracha et al., 2013). This result verifies the second research 
hypothesis, as far as family stability. Concerning the area of origin, immigrants coming 
from Latin American, Middle Eastern and Eastern European countries appear to be the 
most satisfied with life, while immigrants coming from Sub-Saharan African countries 
are the least satisfied, as previous research has shown (e.g. Cesareo and Blangiardo, 
2009). The existence of “smaller cultural discrepancies” (D’Isanto et al., 2016: 1124) 
between the area of origin and the country of residence for Latin Americans living in 
Spain, Portugal or Italy, appears to have a positive effect on life satisfaction10. For 
instance, the use of the same language, or the use of a language that is not very distant 
from the native one, can reduce immigrants’ difficulties of interaction with natives, 
increase the chances of incorporation into the labour market and, therefore, promote 
social mobility. For Eastern Europeans, ethno-cultural similarity and geographical 
proximity can play a positive role in determining their satisfaction with life into the new 
residence country. Finally, Middle Easter immigrants, such as Turks, represent an 
ancient immigrant group in Western Europe, especially in Germany: the first arrivals of 
Turks in Germany started in the 1960s, with the recruitment agreement of 1961 
(Ersanilli and Koopmans, 2011). As a result of their ancient migration history in 
Western Europe, Turkish immigrants are one of the first immigrant groups to 
experience the aging of its first-generation members and the growing of the second- and 
third-generations, which are typical features of a well-stabilized and integrated 
population of immigrants in the host country (Cesareo and Blangiardo, 2009). I believe 
that this factor can contribute to determine Middle Easter immigrants’ positive life 
                                                          
10 The specific variable labeled cultural similarity, which indicates the existence of colonial and post-
colonial ties between origin and residence countries, and which implies the presence of cultural common 
features among them, is not significant, because it has been probably captured by the variable area of 
origin. Nevertheless, in other regression models it appears to be significant (see the Appendix). 
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satisfaction and integration into the residence country. These results verify the third and 
the fifth research hypothesis.  
When introducing the human capital variables, the variable current economic situation 
contributes quite significantly to the model: unemployed immigrants are less satisfied 
with life, compared to those who are employed, as previous research has stressed (e.g. 
Clark and Oswald, 1994). The perceived financial well-being contributes significantly 
to the model, too. As predictable, a worse perceived financial well-being decreases 
immigrants’ self-reported life satisfaction. Perceived financial well-being is a subjective 
indicator of integration, which can be interpreted as a proxy of income. As recently 
highlighted (D’Isanto et al., 2016; Schalembier, 2016; Tibesigwa et al., 2016), many 
studies have examined the association between life satisfaction and income, at both 
individual and country level. Although this association is quite complex and not 
unidirectional, because of psychological and relative factors, which should be taken into 
account, by strengthening individuals’ economic capabilities, security and 
independence, income increases life satisfaction and, therefore, improves immigrants’ 
socio-economic integration into the residence country. Moreover, in the light of the 
micro-perspective of the neoclassical theory of migration (e.g. Sjaastad, 1962; Todaro, 
1969), as migration requires monetary and human capital investment, the expected 
positive net return in the form of real income or job perspectives is a sign of a 
completed mission in the residence country, as goals and targets have been achieved. 
Educational attainment has a negative impact on immigrants’ self-reported life 
satisfaction. Therefore, immigrants that are more educated show lower levels of life 
satisfaction, compared to less educated immigrants. The scientific literature recognizes 
the interrelated role played by educational attainment, access to the labour market and 
economic well-being in the integration process (e.g. Di Bartolomeo and Strozza, 2014; 
Di Bartolomeo et al., 2015). High educational and professional careers are, indeed, 
indicators for immigrants to be successful integrated into the receiving society (Crul and 
Vermeulen, 2003; Schneider and Crul, 2010). Nevertheless, the role of over-
qualification cannot be overlooked when analysing immigrant integration processes. In 
particular, immigrants with higher educational attainment can report a lower satisfaction 
with life, since they probably experience more difficulties in finding a proper job and 
they have to accept an occupation, which is less qualified compared to their level of 
education (Khattab and Fox, 2016). Therefore, the second research hypothesis is 
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verified with the exception of the educational attainment11. Age, age squared, gender, 
marital status and area of origin remain significant in both the models.  
When introducing the ‘immigration’ variables, age, age squared, gender, marital status, 
area of origin, current economic situation and perceived financial well-being remain 
significant. However, Latin American and Eastern European immigrants become not 
significant and Middle Eastern and North African immigrants show less levels of 
satisfaction with life, compared to Asians. On this regard, it can be helpful to note that, 
although immigrants from Turkey represent by far the largest immigrant group in 
Germany, few of them have the German citizenship (Ehrkamp and Leitner, 2003). 
Therefore, when controlling for the ‘immigration’ variables, the advantage position of 
Middle Eastern immigrants disappears. Years since migration have been defined as “a 
key factor in the integration process” (Piché, 2004: 352). In particular, integration is 
considered a long-term process and a higher number of years since migration highlights 
the maturity of this process in the residence country (Mussino et al., 2014). Moreover, it 
can reveal a process of selectivity, which excludes temporary immigrants, who planned 
to spend only a short period abroad, and unsatisfied immigrants, who decided to return 
home because their migration projects failed (Cassarino, 2004; de Haas et al., 2014; 
Giner-Monfort et al., 2015). As far as the effect of years since migration on self-
reported life satisfaction, Amit (2010) has found that the number of years since 
migration improves immigrants’ life satisfaction, as the more years immigrants are 
living in the residence country, the higher the level of their economic and labour market 
position. On the contrary, Safi (2010) revealed that immigrants’ life satisfaction 
generally decreases over time and that it can increase only after a long time spent into 
the residence country. Nevertheless, in my models both years since migration and the 
square of the years since migration are not significant. However, depending on which 
dimension of life satisfaction is analysed, the effect of years since migration changes, as 
shown in the Appendix. As far as the legal status, immigrants holding the citizenship of 
the country of residence appear to be the most satisfied with life. As highlighted in the 
second paper, international literature (e.g. Portes and Curtis, 1987; Yang, 1994; Castles, 
1995; Joppke, 1999; Koopmans and Statham, 1999; Bauböck, 2006; Guiraudon, 2014) 
has largely demonstrated the pivotal role played by citizenship for immigrants’ process 
of integration into the residence country. In particular, as stressed by Ersanilli and 
                                                          
11 For further discussion on the effect of educational attainment on life satisfaction, see the Appendix.  
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Koopmans (2010), two positions exist on the public debate on the issue of the 
citizenship status to immigrants residing in European countries. The first position 
argues that citizenship stimulates integration. From this point of view, citizenship is not 
the end of the integration process, but rather one of the many aspects constituting the 
whole process of integration of immigrants into the residence country. On the contrary, 
the second position argues that citizenship is the final step of the integration process; 
therefore, immigrants holding the citizenship of the residence country are expected to 
have completed their integration process. These positions can have different 
implications for the easiness with which immigrants can obtain the citizenship status of 
the new residence country. Nevertheless, both agree that citizenship is a legal status, 
which, by providing the same status and rights of native-born residents, contributes to 
improve parity with natives, strength foreign-born citizens’ sense of identity – which 
enhances social cohesion (Holtug, 2016) – and, therefore, shape integration (Joopke, 
2010). Moreover, literature has linked the citizenship status to immigrants’ circular 
mobility and, therefore, to the possibility to easily travel to the origin country without 
any fear of losing the residence status, or to move to other European countries to find 
better life conditions and economic opportunities (e.g. Massey et al., 2015). On the 
contrary, humanitarian immigrants show the least level of life satisfaction: their stay in 
the residence country is more precarious and uncomfortable, compared to other 
categories of immigrants (Connor, 2010). Due to their weak migration networks and 
poor human capital (Sciortino, 2006), humanitarian immigrants generally face many 
integration difficulties. As recently elucidated by Ortensi (2015), although they are not 
excluded from the access to regular employment, as one could expect, they generally 
experiment high level of unemployment, mainly because of their poor education, 
language and working skills, insecure living conditions and fragile social networks in 
the residence country. Moreover, because European societies often perceive them as a 
treat to inner security and social cohesion, they often experiment episodes of 
discrimination and xenophobia. Only some of the above-mentioned factors are 
controlled in the model, therefore the disadvantage position of humanitarian immigrants 
persists. Therefore, the sixth research hypothesis is tested, as far as legal status, but not 
as far as the variable years since migration. Finally, when the residence country is 
considered, results show that immigrants residing in Belgium are the most satisfied with 
life, while immigrants living in Hungary and Italy appear to be the least satisfied with 
life and, therefore, the least integrated. Several factors, which combine personal 
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resources from within immigrants’ own families and communities in receiving 
countries, and educational, social and economic opportunities that institutions in 
receiving countries provide to immigrants can contribute to define these patterns of life 
satisfaction. Therefore, the seventh research hypothesis is verified too.  
 
Table 3.3. Ordered logistic regressions models with dependent variable life satisfaction 
with your life these days (N =7,468) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Independent variables 
Odds 
Ratios 
Signif. Odds 
Ratios 
Signif. Odds 
Ratios 
Signif. 
DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES       
Age 0.959 *** 0.977 ** 0.975 * 
Age squared 1.586 *** 1.339 ** 1.292 * 
Female (ref. cat. = male) 1.201 *** 1.183 *** 1.164 *** 
Marital Status (ref. cat. = legally 
married or civil union) 
      
- Legally separated, divorced, 
civil union dissolved 
0.608 *** 0.685 *** 0.666 *** 
- Living with partner 0.843 * 0.902  0.908  
- Single 0.932  0.953  0.964  
- Widowed, civil partner died  0.558 *** 0.621 *** 0.660 ** 
Area of origin (ref. cat. = Asia)       
- Eastern Europe 1.165 * 1.137 ** 1.004  
- Latin America 1.352 *** 1.492 *** 1.172  
- Middle East 1.195 *** 1.079 *** 0.730 *** 
- North Africa 1.086  1.294  0.799 * 
- Sub-Saharan Africa 0.584 *** 0.830 * 0.614 *** 
Cultural similarity 1.066  1.020  0.968  
HUMAN CAPITAL 
VARIABLES 
      
Current economic situation (ref. 
cat. = in paid work) 
      
- Doing housework or other   1.010  0.963  
- In education   1.065  1.066  
- Retired, sick, disabled   0.837  0.760 * 
- Unemployed   0.681 *** 0.646 *** 
Perceived financial well-being 
(ref. cat. = comfortable) 
      
- Sufficient    0.564 *** 0.573 *** 
- Difficult   0.306 *** 0.316 *** 
- Very difficult   0.146 *** 0.163 *** 
Educational attainment (in years)   0.982 *** 0.985 ** 
IMMIGRATION VARIABLES       
Years since migration     1.009  
Years since migration squared     0.967  
1.5 generation (ref. cat. = 1st     1.019  
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generation) 
Legal status (ref. cat. = work or 
study) 
      
- Family reunion     1.163  
- Humanitarian      0.854 * 
- National     1.555 *** 
- Other legal status      1.263 * 
- Permanent/long-term residence 
permit  
    1.225 ** 
Residence country (ref. cat. = 
Belgium) 
      
- France      0.784 * 
- Germany     0.795 * 
- Hungary     0.416 *** 
- Italy     0.439 *** 
- Portugal     0.624 *** 
- Spain     0.836 * 
Significance: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.  
Source: Own elaboration on ICS data 
 
 
3.5. Conclusions 
Aim of this paper has been to measure the effect of demographic, human capital and 
‘immigration’ variables on the self-reported life satisfaction of young and adult 
immigrants residing in seven European countries. Self-reported life satisfaction has 
been used to evaluate immigrants’ integration into the residence country, as it is 
commonly employed to estimate the perceived quality of life within a country or a 
specific social group. Self-reported life satisfaction is centred on personal judgments 
and criteria, not on criteria that are judged important by others (Neto, 2001), thus it 
appears very suitable to take into account immigrants’ view on their experience into the 
residence country and, therefore, to assess their subjective integration.  
The multivariate regression results show that self-reported life satisfaction strongly 
depends on immigrants’ demographic characteristics and human capital factors, such as 
age, marital status, current economic situation and perceived financial well-being. 
Nevertheless, when controlling for ‘immigration’ variables, the association between life 
satisfaction and demographic and human capital variables changes, thus proving that 
not only factors at origin (immigrants’ background characteristics), but also conditions 
at destination are important in determining immigrants’ self-reported life satisfaction. In 
particular, legal status and residence country play a significant role in defining 
immigrants’ life satisfaction, thus demonstrating that the ensemble of rights, resources 
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and restrictions immigrants find into the country of residence shapes their satisfaction 
with life and, therefore, their subjective integration (e.g. Morris, 2001; Vertovec, 2007). 
Therefore, our results provide support for the importance of the individual determinants 
in explaining immigrants’ satisfaction with life into the residence country and the 
differences modelling integration patterns in European societies. The concurrent role 
played by demographic, human capital and ‘immigration’ variables in explaining 
immigrants’ self-reported life satisfaction and, therefore, their integration into the 
residence country provides evidence for the dynamic, multidimensional and 
bidirectional character of the integration process in immigrants’ receiving countries 
(Pennix, 2003; 2004). To conclude, accounting for immigrants’ self-reported life 
satisfaction means to study life conditions and perceived life conditions of immigrants 
in our societies. I believe that this issue is diriment for improving resources and 
structures to be allocated to immigrants and their descendants, which are a stable and 
pervasive feature of European social landscapes (Sciortino, 2016). In other words, 
analysing the implications of immigrants’ self-reported life satisfaction can stimulate 
the planning and the construction of new regimes of immigrant incorporation, for the 
peaceful cohabitation of different populations and the enhancement of the social 
cohesion and progress of our countries and cities. 
  
3.6. Appendix 
Ordered logistic regression models on each of the other variables measuring life 
satisfaction, therefore, on ‘your present level of education’, ‘your accommodation’, 
‘your family life’, ‘your health’ and ‘your social life’ have been performed. The results 
have been displayed in a unique table (Table 3.4) for a better comparability.  
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Table 3.4. Odds ratios of the ordered logistic regression models with dependent variable each other dimension of life satisfaction (N =7,468) 
 
Model on life 
satisfaction 
with ‘your 
present level 
of education’ 
Model on life 
satisfaction with 
‘your 
accommodation’ 
Model on life 
satisfaction 
with ‘your 
family life’  
Model on life 
satisfaction 
with ‘your 
health’  
Model on 
life 
satisfaction 
with ‘your 
social life’ 
Independent variables      
DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES      
Age 0.994 0.987 0.946*** 0.946*** 0.939*** 
Age squared 1.101 1.204 1.649*** 1.287* 1.734*** 
Female (ref. cat. = male) 1.042 1.138** 1.167*** 0.818*** 0.875** 
Marital Status (ref. cat. = legally married or civil union)      
- Legally separated, divorced, civil union dissolved 0.897 0.806* 0.297*** 0.866* 0.671*** 
- Living with partner 1.045 1.087 0.767** 0.839* 1.048 
- Single 1.100 0.848** 0.441*** 0.873* 1.016 
- Widowed, civil partner died  0.726* 0.793* 0.393*** 0.743* 0.660** 
Area of origin (ref. cat. = Asia)      
- Eastern Europe 1.309*** 1.121 1.431*** 1.120 1.363*** 
- Latin America 1.201* 1.252* 1.661*** 1.431*** 1.670*** 
- Middle East 0.868 0.727*** 1.285** 1.099 1.412*** 
- North Africa 0.884 0.696*** 1.059 1.027 1.219* 
- Sub-Saharan Africa 1.013 0.762** 1.018 1.221* 1.121 
Cultural similarity 1.051 1.197* 1.140 1.071 1.117 
HUMAN CAPITAL VARIABLES      
Current economic situation (ref. cat. = in paid work)      
- Doing housework or other 0.785** 1.005 1.146 0.960 0.878 
- In education 1.601*** 0.969 0.930 0.848* 0.955 
- Retired, sick, disabled 0.725** 1.019 0.876 0.268*** 0.523*** 
- Unemployed 0.917 0.821** 0.915 0.987 0.903 
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Perceived financial well-being (ref. cat. = comfortable)      
- Sufficient  0.530*** 0.657*** 0.806*** 0.739*** 0.671*** 
- Difficult 0.409*** 0.395*** 0.569*** 0.580*** 0.552*** 
- Very difficult 0.334*** 0.215*** 0.386*** 0.446*** 0.394*** 
Educational attainment (in years) 1.110*** 1.000 1.002 1.013* 0.991 
IMMIGRATION VARIABLES      
Years since migration 0.989 1.004 1.013* 0.981** 1.039*** 
Years since migration squared 1.262* 1.011 0.878 1.563*** 0.626*** 
1.5 generation (ref. cat. = 1st generation) 1.194* 1.137* 1.184* 1.070 0.985 
Legal status (ref. cat. = work or study)      
- Family reunion 0.889 1.141 1.468*** 1.057 1.188* 
- Humanitarian  0.601*** 0.655** 0.711* 0.935 1.229 
- National 1.263** 1.367*** 1.600*** 1.217* 1.374*** 
- Other legal status  1.292* 0.841 1.117 0.880 1.160 
- Permanent/long-term residence permit  0.987 1.021 1.353*** 1.069 1.344*** 
Residence country (ref. cat. = Belgium)      
- France  0.875 0.449*** 1.285* 1.053 0.720** 
- Germany 0.524*** 0.673** 1.202* 1.252* 0.782** 
- Hungary 0.772** 0.895 1.252* 1.124 0.860 
- Italy 0.671*** 0.739** 0.989 0.878 0.686*** 
- Portugal 1.085 2.316*** 2.390*** 2.273*** 1.569** 
- Spain 1.009 0.810* 1.267* 1.089 0.930 
Significance: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.  
Source: Own elaboration on ICS data 
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However, to provide an item that rates satisfaction with life as a whole, I have reduced 
the dimensions of life satisfaction (‘your life these days’, ‘your present level of 
education’, ‘your accommodation’, ‘your family life’, ‘your health’ and ‘your social 
life’), carrying out a Principal Component Analysis (PCA), with varimax rotation. 
Before performing the PCA, a predictive mean matching method has been used to 
impute the missing data contained in each variable of life satisfaction. I am aware that 
PCA is a multivariate technique that is oriented to numerical data. However, if we 
assume the existence of the same distance in the ordinal scale variables measuring life 
satisfaction, this method can be applied, even though with some caution in the 
interpretation of the results. In the light of these considerations, the PCA extracted one 
factor (with eigenvalue > 1) explaining 45% of the total variance12. Each respondent has 
been assigned a life satisfaction score based on the factor loadings (see Table 3.5). After 
standardizing this to mean zero and standard deviation one, I have used the score as the 
dependent variable in the stepwise ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, which is 
shown in Table 3.6. The interpretation of the life satisfaction score is as follows: the 
higher the score, the higher respondents’ level of self-reported life satisfaction.  
 
Table 3.5. Factor loadings (N = 7,468) 
 Factor loadings 
Your life these days 0.438 
Your present level of education 0.364 
Your accommodation 0.399 
Your family life 0.424 
Your health 0.393 
Your social life 0.424 
Source: Own elaboration on ICS data 
 
Table 3.6. Beta coefficients of the ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions with 
dependent variable life satisfaction as a whole (N =7,468) 
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
DEMOGRAPHIC 
VARIABLES 
   
Age -0.044 *** -0.047*** -0.039*** 
Age squared  0.307 ***  0.445***  0.308** 
Female (ref. cat. =  0.020 -0.001  0.014 
                                                          
12 I have not taken into account the second factor extracted by PCA, which explained 13% of the total 
variance, because it has a lower effect on each dimension of self-reported life satisfaction, compared to 
the first one. 
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male) 
Marital Status (ref. 
cat. = legally married 
or civil union) 
   
- Legally separated, 
divorced, civil union 
dissolved 
-0.759*** -0.624*** -0.598*** 
- Living with partner -0.253 ** -0.174* -0.068 
- Single -0.267*** -0.259*** -0.259*** 
- Widowed, civil 
partner died  
-0.745*** -0.616*** -0.536*** 
Area of origin (ref. cat. 
= Asia) 
   
- Eastern Europe  0.509***  0.408***  0.211*** 
- Latin America  0.515***  0.549***  0.357*** 
- Middle East  0.203***  0.140* -0.082 
- North Africa -0.066  0.104* -0.140* 
- Sub-Saharan Africa -0.139*  0.206** -0.111 
Cultural similarity  0.278***  0.283***  0.098 
HUMAN CAPITAL 
VARIABLES 
   
Current economic 
situation (ref. cat. = in 
paid work) 
   
- Doing housework or 
other 
 -0.069 -0.062 
- In education   0.025  0.050 
- Retired, sick, 
disabled 
 -0.521*** -0.614*** 
- Unemployed  -0.179*** -0.217*** 
Perceived financial 
well-being (ref. cat. = 
comfortable) 
   
- Sufficient   -0.476*** -0.472*** 
- Difficult  -1.014*** -0.979*** 
- Very difficult  -1.743*** -1.636*** 
Educational attainment 
(in years) 
  0.017***  0.020*** 
IMMIGRATION 
VARIABLES 
   
Years since migration    0.009* 
Years since migration 
squared 
  -0.019 
1.5 generation (ref. 
cat. = 1st generation) 
   0.144* 
Legal status (ref. cat. = 
work or study) 
   
- Family reunion    0.190* 
- Humanitarian    -0.344** 
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- National    0.410*** 
- Other legal status     0.056 
- Permanent/long-term 
residence permit  
   0.212*** 
Residence country 
(ref. cat. = Belgium) 
   
- France    -0.358*** 
- Germany   -0.282*** 
- Hungary   -0.430*** 
- Italy   -0.635*** 
- Portugal    0.254** 
- Spain   -0.080 
Multiple 𝑅2  0.07  0.18  0.22 
-values  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
Source: Own elaboration on ICS data 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Aim of this work has been to understand if integration policies help immigrants to 
enhance their long-term success and parity with natives. Immigrant integration has been 
conceived as the process aimed at reducing gaps with natives, therefore at providing to 
immigrants the same opportunities of native-born citizens, in the main domains of life. 
The first paper has offered a comparative overview of civic integration programmes 
adopted by European countries in recent years. The European convergence towards 
civic integration means that all across Europe residence and citizenship rights are 
granted to immigrants if civic requirements, such the knowledge of the language and 
cultural values of the residence country are fulfilled. Italy also turned to civic 
integration officially in 2012, with the entry into force of the Integration Agreement, 
which newcomers have to sign few days after the entry into the Italian territory, in order 
to obtain a regular permit of stay. Civic integration has conciliated different Italian 
governments in believing that in a country where by now immigrants represent a stable 
and structural component of the Italian population, integration should occur under the 
values enshrined in the Italian Constitution, as clearly stated by the Integration 
Agreement. Although it is well recognised that the acquisition of destination language 
skills enhances immigrants’ social mobility and improves their socio-economic 
integration, the comparative analysis of civic integration programmes adopted by 14 
European countries in the last two decades has highlighted that civic integration 
produces a ‘stratification’ of the immigrant population in receiving countries. In 
particular, since it builds up different integration regimes, as refugees and family 
immigrants are required to follow language and civic courses, while temporary and 
high-skilled immigrants are totally exempted, I have argued that civic integration tends 
to exacerbate the gap between high-skilled and low-skilled immigrants, therefore 
between wanted and unwanted migration. Therefore, I have concluded that the logic 
behind the European convergence towards civic integration appears to be the same 
characterizing the current immigration policy at European level: a logic of increasing 
migration prevention, control and selection (e.g. Bonjour, 2011; Carling, 2002; Geddes, 
2003). As consequence, civic requirements have become new standards for immigrants 
and refugees to be admitted and integrated into receiving societies. Their parity with 
natives lies in the knowledge of alleged universal values, such as host country’s 
language and civic norms. Nevertheless, my study has shown that the interpretation and 
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the effectively implementation of civic integration largely varies across countries, 
according to their philosophies of integration and, therefore, to the traditional national 
models of immigration and integration. Consequently, a gap between the dominant 
policy discourse about civic integration (the so-called ‘normative model’) in Europe, the 
civic programmes (policy outputs) implemented by European countries and, finally, the 
effective spread of civic integration among immigrants residing in European countries 
(social processes) has been found, when civic programmes and ICS data have been 
analysed. Indeed, the proportion of immigrants who followed or completed a civic 
course in the countries I have included into the multivariate analyses was very limited 
and, thus, its statistical significance null. This has led me to use the term ‘civic rhetoric’ 
to describe this part of the thesis.  
Civic integration is strongly embedded into citizenship, since it establishes under what 
conditions eligible immigrants can obtain the citizenship status of the new residence 
country (Wallace Goodman, 2012). Academic literature recognises citizenship status as 
an objective indicator of immigrant integration (e.g. Diehl and Blohm, 2003; Vink, 
2013), as it helps to reduce gaps with natives, at least as far as status and rights gained 
into the receiving society. As elucidated by a vast corpus of literature that I have 
analysed (e.g. Portes and Curtis, 1987; Yang, 1994; Howard, 2009; Ersanilli and 
Koopmans, 2011), the acquisition of citizenship status of the new residence country 
depends not only on immigrants’ individual characteristics, but also on policy factors, 
such as national citizenship policies, which fix criteria for immigrants’ eligibility to 
naturalization. Although European countries have converged towards civic requirements 
to grant citizenship rights, conditions under which immigrants become naturalized 
citizens are still quite diverse among countries, depending also on the traditional 
national models of immigration and integration. This demonstrates, among other things, 
that despite a certain liberalization of policies and the “post-nationalization of 
immigrant rights” (Koopmans, 2012), the naturalization of immigrants is still intimately 
connected to the national sovereignty and policy-making. Therefore, the second paper 
has aimed to examine the effect of both individual-level characteristics and measures of 
national citizenship policies on the likelihood of having citizenship status among young 
and adult immigrants living in selected European countries. The traditional national 
models of immigration and integration have been used as the main interpretative key of 
the research findings. In particular, results have highlighted the strong effect of 
individual characteristics on citizenship status among young and adult immigrants and, 
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therefore, the positive effect of higher family stability, educational attainment, current 
economic situation, perceived financial well-being, duration of residence and cultural 
similarity between the country of residence and the country of origin. Nevertheless, 
policy factors intervene to produce this effect. In particular, a low number of years of 
residence needed for naturalization, the dual citizenship toleration and relatively high 
naturalization rates and proportions of foreign citizens positively influence citizenship 
status among young and adult immigrants. Therefore, the combination of these factors 
appears to be an optimal mix for promoting the acquisition of citizenship status among 
immigrants and, therefore, their integration. These conditions seem to pertain more to 
France and Belgium, where the shift from assimilationist to anti-discrimination policies 
has occurred without renouncing to the use of integration contracts for newcomers, as 
the ‘Contrat d’accueil et de l’intégration’ and the ‘Integration contract’ included in the 
‘Citizenisation’ policy respectively demonstrate. On the contrary, limiting immigrants’ 
integration to the incorporation into the labour market, as often occurs in Southern 
European and exclusionist countries, such as Italy and Germany, coexists not without 
any difficulty with the process of granting to immigrants the same civil and political 
participation of natives, which would arise from the citizenship status. It is not a 
casualty that Italy is the least favourable to grant the citizenship status to immigrants 
and one of the countries where immigrants are the least satisfied with life.  
Self-reported life satisfaction has been used in the third paper to assess immigrants’ 
subjective integration. Self-reported life satisfaction has allowed to take into account not 
only objective forms of integration, such as educational attainment, economic situation, 
employment and legal status (citizenship), but also immigrants’ perceptions about their 
life into the residence country and about whether integration policies help them to 
enhance their long-term success and parity with natives, which is the broader aim of my 
thesis. This is also in line with the idea that integration is a multidimensional and two-
way process, which implies the contribution and the point of view of both newcomers 
and hosting societies. Therefore, the last paper, which adds to the research strand of 
subjective integration (e.g. Neto, 1995; 2011; Amit, 2010), has intended to measure the 
effect of demographic, human capital and ‘immigration’ variables on the self-reported 
life satisfaction of young and adult immigrants living in selected European countries, 
using the ICS data. The multivariate analysis has shown that self-reported life 
satisfaction strongly depends on immigrants’ demographic characteristics and human 
capital factors, such as age, marital status, current economic situation and perceived 
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financial well-being. However, when controlling for the ‘immigration’ variables, the 
effect of these factors changes, thus proving that ‘immigration’ variables, and in 
particular legal status and residence country, play a role in shaping self-reported life 
satisfaction among young and adult immigrants. In particular, immigrants holding the 
citizenship status report the highest level of life satisfaction, thus demonstrating that 
citizenship is a good indicator to evaluate if conditions at destination can positively 
meet immigrants’ expectations to determine life satisfaction and, therefore, integration 
into the residence country (Massey and Akresh, 2006).  
Therefore, the research findings have demonstrated the importance of the individual 
determinants in explaining immigrants’ satisfaction with life, the combined effect of 
demographic, human capital and ‘immigration’ variables in accounting for self-reported 
life satisfaction, and the multidimensional character of the integration process. 
Additional analysis, reported in the Appendix, has confirmed that self-reported life 
satisfaction is always strongly linked to immigrants’ familiar and economic conditions 
(i.e. marital status, current economic situation and perceived financial well-being, with 
the latter always being very statistically significant) and that a more permanent legal 
status, especially having the citizenship status of the residence country increases life 
satisfaction among young and adult immigrants residing in European countries. It has 
also revealed that the association between self-reported life satisfaction and the 
residence country changes depending on which dimension of life satisfaction is 
considered, thus proving that the context matters (for instance, immigrants living in 
Portugal report the highest level of satisfaction with life in many domains) and, finally, 
that self-reported life satisfaction is a complex and multilayered phenomenon, which 
requires much investigation and insight. I believe that researchers and policy-makers 
alike should take advantage of research on self-reported life satisfaction and subjective 
integration of immigrants, in order to construct and implement policies, which take into 
account not only reception societies’ needs, but also immigrants’ opinions, necessities 
and expectations. With civic integration and citizenship policies, self-reported life 
satisfaction appears to be a piece of the puzzle that completes one of the many possible 
pictures for the study of immigrant integration and its policy-making in Europe.  
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